
The subtitle of this book—*The Philosophical Youth of Mikhail Bakunin*—is a precise definition of its topic: it is a monograph of the young Bakunin, ending on the eve of the Springtime of the Peoples. Thus, it does not cover Bakunin’s life as a revolutionary, as the recognized leader of European Anarchism, the main adversary of Marx in the First International. Nevertheless, the book opens with a thirty-two-page introduction which offers an interesting and competent review of the enormous international literature on Bakunin’s life and activities as a whole. The author limits his task to the early, “philosophical” period of Bakunin’s life but says at the same time that his intention was to provide “the first biography of Bakunin” in Polish (p. 35). A footnote on page 159 explains that the book will be followed by a second volume. If so, the introduction on the entire literature on Bakunin is justified (otherwise it should be limited to the literature on Bakunin’s youth), but the concluding three pages, offering a telegraphic and superficial summary of Bakunin the revolutionary, are clearly superfluous.

In contrast to the authors who tried to interpret Bakunin’s thought as an expression of his psychological problems (A. P. Mendel, 1981; A. Kelly, 1982) Kamiński treats Bakunin’s philosophy seriously, carefully tracing its evolution, reconstructing its inner coherence in each of its phases, and concentrating on its intellectual contexts. He provides a balanced summary of the existing knowledge, adding to it some interesting details and correcting one-sided interpretations. He gives also a sympathetic account of Bakunin’s religious phase, presenting his “religion of love” as a form of genuine, non-Orthodox religiosity—a variant of panentheism, combining religious immanentism with a millenarian dimension.

An impressive contribution of Kamiński’s book is the elucidation of the role of the different Polish contexts of Bakunin’s thought. The author convincingly shows the importance of Bakunin’s contact with Joachim Lelewel, the Polish Democratic Society (TDP), Karol Libelt, and Adam Mickiewicz, as professor at the Collège de France and the editor of *La Tribune des Peuples*. He pays due attention not only to Bakunin’s complicated relations with the Polish political emigration but also to reactions to his thought in Poland: to the fact that Bakunin’s famous philosophical essay *The Reaction in Germany* (1842) was translated in the Poznan newspaper *Tygodnik literacki* (1843) and exercised an influence on the Left-Hegelian philosopher, Edward Dembowski, the future leader of the Cracow uprising of February 1846. Most important, he demonstrates that this abortive, but truly radical uprising, constituted a turning point, a genuine watershed, in Bakunin’s life. The Russian thinker, together with the TDP, formally proclaimed his accession to it and saw this day as the symbolic beginning of his revolutionary activity. Hence, his birth as a revolutionary occurred in 1846 (not in 1848) and took place in the Polish political milieu. (It should be added that Kamiński comes to this conclusion without obliterating the differences between Bakunin and his Polish partners.)

On the whole, Kamiński’s monograph could, perhaps, be better if it were more concise. Covering the rest of Bakunin’s life with the same fullness of detail would require at least two comparable volumes. At present the author approaches Russian Anarchism from the other end. He recently published an extremely interesting, fully innovative study on “Post-Classical currents of Russian Anarchism: 1900–1930,” dealing with the Mystic Anarchists and Anarcho-Mystics, the Associative Anarchists, the Anarcho-Universalists and the Anarcho-Biocosmists (2004). This study,
in conjunction with the competent survey of the literature on Bakunin’s Anarchism in the introduction to the book under review, shows that the author has a chance to become one of the best experts in his large field.

Andrzej Walicki, University of Notre Dame


Gogol’s Dead Souls is one of those books about which seemingly everything that could possibly be said has already been said. It is all the more amazing then that Urs Heftrich manages to propose a genuinely innovative and illuminating reinterpretation of the novel. The expression “Schuld und Sühne” (guilt and atonement), the title under which Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment has become known in German, highlights the moral angle of Heftrich’s approach. He understands Dead Souls essentially as a work of narrative theology. Gogol himself, to be sure, insisted on the moral and religious mission of his writings, but a prevailing trend in Gogol criticism since Belinsky has been to dismiss the religious thinker Gogol in favor of the realist and satirist. Heftrich, however, takes Gogol’s claim that his novel should lead to a moral regeneration seriously—as a program that demonstrably underlines the composition and structure of Dead Souls down to the most minute details.

Heftrich’s most original insight is his idea to link Chichikov’s short biography, which Gogol inserted toward the end of the novel in chapter 11 and which has generally been considered relatively uninteresting and unimportant, with Chichikov’s visits to the five landowners. He claims that each of the landowners symbolically represents a previous station in Chichikov’s life, but in reverse chronological order. Chichikov performs, as it were, a trip backward in time in which he is confronted with various manifestations of his own corruption. The core of his sinfulness, as well as of Gogol’s obsession with his own moral guilt, lies in the violation of the Eighth Commandment. The problematic relationship between language and truth, as Heftrich demonstrates, forms the central philosophical conundrum of Dead Souls. In mythological terms, Chichikov’s visit to the five landowners represents a descent into the Netherworld, with Nozdrev, as a sort of Lord of Lies, marking the lowest point of Gogol’s Inferno. As Heftrich explains, each landowner represents the non-congruence between word and referent in a different way. For Manilov, rhetoric becomes an aim in itself as the word completely replaces any referent. Korobochka, who carries features of a chthonic goddess, threatens to merge word and thing in an act of pagan magic. The inveterate liar Nozdrev severs any connection between language and truth, whereas the cynical and sceptical Sobakevich distrusts the word in favor of the thing. Interestingly enough, Heftrich argues that the old miser Pliushkin, in spite of his corruption, embodies the potential for ultimate redemption and for a divine congruence between word and thing. It is no accident that he is the only landowner with a sacral building on his estate, even though his two churches are in disrepair. Chichikov, however, remains blind to the moral lesson offered by his trip. Although Gogol reserved the ultimate redemption for the Purgatorio and Paradiso that were later to follow his Inferno, the “revenge” of truth occurs already in the fallen world of the here and now. Ironically, the liar Chichikov is punished by a form of public lie, as the “Gerücht” (rumor) turns into a “Gericht” (tribunal). Heftrich analyzes the inexorable logic of Chichikov’s downfall as analogous to the five acts of a tragedy.

Heftrich’s approach combines a close reading of the text’s architecture and motif structure with an overarching hermeneutic that reflects Gogol’s own moral concerns. In this sense, his book does for Dead Souls what Dmitry Chizhevsky’s famous essay did a few decades earlier for Gogol’s “Overcoat.” The author supports his claims with a wealth of observations from the novel, with citations from Gogol’s correspondence, as well as with references to his possible sources, including
Schiller, Homer, Dante, and others. The Gogol emerging from this book is a Christian allegorist who couches his message in a tightly constructed web of allusions and correspondences. This may not be the humorist and absurdist that we have come to appreciate, but it is an approach to Gogol’s work that cannot be ignored. Heftrich’s book is a must read for anyone with a serious interest in Dead Souls.

Adrian Wanner, Pennsylvania State University


This is a book about the Jewish connection in the life and thought of the Formalist theorist and Tolstoy scholar Boris Eikhenbaum (1886–1959). James Curtis provides a thumbnail family history and an “intellectual genealogy” of Russian Formalism, which he regards as a movement of assimilated Jews. In Curtis’s view, “Eikhenbaum’s Jewish origins spurred him to assimilate into the majority culture through the study of literature” (p. 34), and he credentialed himself for entree into Russian culture by concentrating on a writer of impeccable lineage, Count Leo Tolstoy.

Citing as his methodological model Eric Erikson’s Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History, Curtis hopes to illuminate the experience of being an assimilated Jew in Russia, and to show the influence of Jewish intellectual culture in Russia between 1900 and 1950. He briefly surveys five generations of Eikhenbaums, beginning with Boris’s paternal grandfather, Iakov Moiseevich Eikhenbaum (1796–1861), who was raised in a Jewish ghetto in Galicia but managed secretly to gain a secular education and eventually won celebrity as a mathematician and poet, and closing with Boris’s daughter and granddaughter, Olga Eikhenbaum and Elizaveta Dal’ (nee Apraksina, 1937–2003). But as Curtis himself acknowledges, too little information exists about Boris’s father and grandfather to construct a family history. From the facts Curtis provides, I conclude that the burden of assimilation fell not on Boris, as Curtis suggests, but on his father Mikhail, who converted to Russian Orthodoxy in order to marry Nadezhda Dormidontovna Glotova, daughter of a Russian admiral in a family of naval officers. Boris, baptized and raised Russian Orthodox, was born a full participant in Russian culture. I am skeptical that he felt the need to create, through Formalist theory, a cultural identity for himself, as Curtis believes.

Curtis shows that Eikhenbaum, with Viktor Shklovskii and Iurii Tynianov, drew upon the philosophical pluralism of Henri Bergson and the Semen Frank (both Jews). Tynianov’s theory of dynamic interaction among literary elements (Problema stikhotvorrenogo iazyka [1924]), and the Tynianov-Jakobson model of culture as a set of parallel series (riady) that affect one another indirectly (a cautious acceptance of outside influences on literature), both mirror the pluralist emphasis of Frank and Bergson. Philosophical pluralism led to social pluralism, a position which, Curtis notes, reflected Jews’ desire for acceptance into the cultural mainstream. The Formalists could have arrived at pluralism via non-Jewish sources, but for Curtis the point is that they did not. As for proving that Formalism derives from Jewish thought, Curtis writes, “the eternal shortage of documents makes this impossible” (p. 119). Instead, he offers numerous insights connecting Formalism to the Frankfurt School, to rabbinic teachings on immanence and transcendence, to Mikhail Bakhtin, and to American Jewish professors such as Lionel Trilling. He revisits the Formalist-Marxist debate with attention to the Jewish connection, and reconsider the persecution of Jewish scholars as “cosmopolitans” in the late forties.

The last one hundred pages of this volume consist of excerpts from Eikhenbaum’s letters to his parents (1905–16) and to Shklovskii (1920s–59). To clarify one point: the manuscript that Eikhenbaum was working on during the siege of Leningrad and then lost on Lake Ladoga was not Tolstoi v semidesiatye gody, as Curtis and some others have written, but its sequel. Eikhenbaum submitted Semidesiatye gody, the third volume of his Tolstoy project, in 1940, but censorship considerations held up its publication. In a letter to Shklovskii of 18 March 1947, Eikhenbaum
writes, “the third volume is being held up [by censorship] and is becoming obsolete, and the fourth was lost at Lake Ladoga” (p. 334). *Semidecitary gody* was published posthumously, but volume four was lost forever.

What does it mean to call Russian Formalism a movement of assimilated Jews? Does it mean simply that its practitioners were Jewish? That they were influenced mainly by the writings of other assimilated Jews? Or that their thought can be traced to Jewish thought? Curtis does not convince me that “Formalist” thought differs from “Russian” thought.

Carol Any, Trinity College


Gregory Carleton, associate professor of Russian at Tufts University, puts together an overview of provocative literary works of the 1920s and the maelstrom of critique, attack, and interest that surrounded sexual themes in fiction, newspapers, and health tracts for a compelling discussion of the “sexual revolution” of the 1920s. Ranging from discussions of sexual disease to abortion, from nudism to suicide, Carleton wishes to underscore the many inconsistencies of Bolshevik policy and points of contention not just between party and populace, but within the party itself.

Carleton places sexuality at the center of discussions of revolution, and clearly presents this topic in wide focus in the early pages of the book using large statistical surveys of universities for discussions of sex and sexuality among youth while also looking at Kollontai’s contributions to the question. From these beginnings he examines the competing concepts of celibacy and procreation as exemplified in health literature and newspaper articles. In particular, a discussion of the “costs” of sexuality and ideal numbers of couplings per week and orgasms per session by competing health experts shows the intersection of Bolshevik producerist rhetoric and puritanism to comical effect. His later chapters bring out stunning examples of “corrupting” literature and a thick description of critical debate in the late 1920s regarding the authors P. Romanov, S. Malashkin, and L. Gumilevsky. Their three works of 1926, “Without a Cherry Blossom,” “Moon on the Right,” and *Dog Alley* incorporated some of the most shocking and disturbing story lines of the 1920s and lead Carleton into a riveting exploration of censorship, the critical voice, and the lack of a coherent party platform. He moves from these to a discussion of “realism” in literature in the late 1920s and the contradictions of “plakat” and “living person” styles, with the eventual triumph in the early 1930s of Socialist Realism and the subsequent settling of the sexual question.

Carleton leaves theoretical discussion to his introduction and conclusion and here makes the greater case for his study by arguing that up until his work the “unstated but continuing goal of critical analysis has been to indict Soviet policies of the 1920s” (p. 17). He cites in this critique Elizabeth Wood and further, argues that Eric Naiman’s study of sexuality in the 1920s is flawed by a similar demonization of the party and seeming “presumptions of near total control by power echelons” (p. 231). Carleton falters here by overstating previous works and creating a straw man—a contemporary analyst of the 1920s who believes in an all-powerful and directed party. In contrast, Wood, Naiman, and other recent Foucauldian-influenced scholars of the 1920s and 1930s such as Anne Gorsuch or David Hoffmann seem more intent on showcasing debates within the party, whether it is Wood describing the almost schizophrenic behavior of the party in regards to rhetoric versus rights for women, or Gorsuch and Naiman showing the fights between party and Komsomol over behavior. Carleton’s attacks seem out of place not just because they were tacked on to beginning and end without integration into the rest of the work, but also because Carleton, who has marshaled a great deal of fascinating detail and painstaking research, did not need them to bring importance to his work.

Overall, this book presents new documents and a great deal of critical discussion and intriguing literature to create a compelling picture of the relatively free discussions of the 1920s. It should be
of great interest to scholars of the history and literature of the 1920s and to those investigating the birth of Socialist Realism in the 1930s.

Tricia Starks, University of Arkansas


In his follow-up to *The Making of the State Reader* (1997), Evgenii Dobrenko continues to explore the often elusive subject of Socialist Realism. Like other recent studies of the 1920s by Eric Naiman and Katerina Clark, Dobrenko is interested in the cultural concepts shaping artistic production, not just the texts themselves. He argues that Socialist Realism was not merely a set of aesthetic values but also a political, educational, and professional system built to perpetuate them. It was as much about the production of interchangeable authors bound by a common view of creativity as it was about the creation of texts. As a result, he rejects any attempts to define a Socialist Realist canon, arguing that all Socialist Realist texts and authors are equally exemplary (p. xix). In his view, only those writers who internalized these values were truly “Soviet”; all others, such as Boris Pasternak, can only be viewed in relation to Soviet literature (p. xiii).

The book traces the development of two Russian nineteenth century “sub-cultural” currents—graphomania and politically oriented literature—into the 1920s, when they exerted a strong influence on literary debates. Dobrenko deftly uses published sources to trace out the positions taken by many of the literary groups of the period, including the Smithy, the Young Guard, and RAPP (The Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) on two key issues. Did talent or training matter for writers? And who exactly was entitled to call themselves a “writer”? He concludes by showing how these discussions were ultimately resolved by the formation of the Union of Soviet Writers and the state-supervised repprofessionalization of writers.

Although Dobrenko considers a number of aesthetic, economic, and social factors, politics lie at the heart of the book. The Young Guard and RAPP were created and empowered by the party in order to foster a new generation of writers, whose loyalty to the party was integral to their aesthetic outlook. These groups stressed training over talent, and drew their adherents from a pool of uneducated, malleable graphomaniacs. The creation of the Writers’ Union after 1932 represented a fine-tuning of this system, not a paradigm shift. Dobrenko also argues provocatively that Maxim Gorky embodied the combination of “realist” aesthetics and emphasis on training that produced decades of reliably turgid prose and poetry in the party’s service.

Dobrenko’s willingness to plunge into the byzantine literary debates of the 1920s, and ability to extract clear positions from a thicket of polemics and manifestos, allows him to provide a fresh and insightful perspective on his subject. He includes lengthy excerpts from poems to bolster his arguments. His insistence on not merely analyzing the content of Soviet cultural artifacts but also understanding the principles underpinning their production is very welcome, and it adds considerably to our knowledge of this period.

Dobrenko is less successful in showing how these ideas came to dominate Soviet cultural life. His take on the intersection of politics and culture in the Soviet Union is at times oversimplified, as in the case of the relationship between RAPP and the Central Committee. The party leadership (“authority”) looms as a monolithic body, able to impose its will on reality from 1923 onward, stripping all others of agency. There is also a tendency to flatten the period between 1923 and 1934 chronologically, further muddying the picture. And key assertions, such as his claim that the majority of the Writers’ Union in the 1930s comprised the barely literate literary-circlists of the 1920s, are at times only supported by limited anecdotal evidence.

Although generally well-written, and ably translated by Jesse M. Savage, the text suffers in places from the overuse of ironic and allusive quotation marks, creating confusion over the meaning
of terms such as “proletarian.” A fair degree of familiarity with the literary politics of the period is assumed—terms such as “Litfront” are used but not defined. Despite any flaws, Dobrenko does much to illuminate the literary landscape of the 1920s, and those interested in the literary and cultural politics of the Soviet Union will find much of interest here.

Brian Kassof, Seattle, Washington


In their introduction, “Ideological Becoming: Bakhtinian Concepts to Guide the Study of Language, Literacy, and Learning,” the editors of this volume outline its objectives with commendable clarity. Beginning from the imperatives to “take diversity seriously and see how it can be a resource,” “understand the mechanisms of growth and change,” and “understand peoples’ struggles to creatively manage those tensions and conflicts that are critical to learning” (p. 9), and referring to their respective experiences in cross-national contexts (Arnetha F. Ball’s in South Africa, Sarah Warshauer Freedman’s in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina), they set the scene for a further twelve articles exploring the theory and practice of literacy and learning.

The contributions are distributed in four parts. Each of the first three sections (“Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations,” “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools,” and “Heteroglossia in a Changing World”) contains four articles, and ends with a short afterword in which one of the graduate students from Stanford and Berkeley who took a course based partly on the book, and which was co-taught by the editors, describes her dialogue with the articles and their authors. Articles and afterwords alike are dense with familiar Bakhtinian terms (“ideological becoming,” “heteroglossia,” “dialogism,” “internally persuasive discourse,” “authoritative discourse,” “chronotope,” and many others), and replete with commonly cited passages from works such as “Discourse in the Novel” or “Problems of Discursive [Speech] Genres.” It is clear that Bakhtin’s thought has provided a powerful array of tools for a group of scholars who have deployed them to beneficial effect and demonstrated how greater self-consciousness and understanding on the part of teachers and taught alike has been developed in settings where the practical stakes are considerably higher than the theoretical. This would appear to confirm the editors’ claim that Bakhtin’s “perspectives remain as current today as when they were first published” (p. 30). However, when one contributor, Eileen Landay, asks, “By using Bakhtin’s ... key concepts ... to explore and analyze a particular approach to literacy teaching and learning ... do we stray too far afield from the circumstances for which these concepts were developed?” (p. 123) she poses a question begged by the book as a whole, and not satisfactorily answered by it if one understands “Bakhtinian perspectives” to be perspectives on as well as from Bakhtin’s work. It is striking that, in a book whose contributors refer to a daunting range of sources in literacy and educational research, there is comparatively little engagement with Bakhtin scholarship. Although pioneering studies from the 1990s by Michael Holquist, Caryl Emerson, and Gary Saul Morson are cited, one searches in vain for evidence of acquaintance with more recent, and no less ground-breaking, work by the likes of Craig Brandist, Ken Hirschkop, Brian Poole, or Galin Tihanov. Not even Morson, whose “The Process of Ideological Becoming” is the only article in Part IV, “A Closing Thought on Bakhtinian Perspectives,” has anything to say about the latest research on Bakhtin. Of course, the editors and contributors could argue quite reasonably that this is a book first and foremost about language, literacy, and learning, and about strategies for their promotion and understanding, and therefore that to stray into what is itself a large and uneven field would be to risk diversion from the task at hand; but since the title gives such prominence to the Russian thinker, it is not unreasonable to expect at least a nod of recognition in the direction of current
Bakhtin studies and the questions being addressed there. Even a modest such acknowledgement would have added to an already rich volume due sensitivity to the implications of the peculiar history of the transmission and translation of Bakhtin’s work, and to the complex ramifications of its sources and affiliations.

To say this is not to argue that Bakhtinian concepts cannot or should not be “applied” to real-life problems; but it is to suggest that, unless we try to understand how Bakhtin came to assemble his potent analytical instruments, we cannot achieve more than an approximate calibration of their true usefulness, and their application may become somewhat mechanical and unsubtle.

David Shepherd, University of Sheffield

HISTORY


The ruling elite of Russia of the seventeenth century has come out of the shadows and onto center stage of the study of Russian politics and society in that period. Twenty years ago Robert Crummey began to identify the members of that elite and traced their changing positions in the hierarchy of court and Duma ranks that gave structure to their political and administrative roles in the state. Crummey analyzed the life of the Duma elite and provided the scholar with a simple list of the holders of the various ranks. Poe’s contribution is to go beyond Crummey’s pioneering work to provide a year by year list of these men, following his sources (the “boyar books” and “boyar lists”) by including the ceremonial offices grouped with the Duma ranks. He concludes with a brief service biography of every holder of at least one of these ranks. The list, compiled by Poe with the help of Ol’ga Kosheleva, Russell Martin, and Boris Morozov, offers a basis for all future work on the elite of seventeenth-century Russia, indeed more information than we have about the elite of the eighteenth and later centuries. This essential research tool occupies the first volume of the set.

The second volume is a quantitative analysis of the data. Poe examines the origins and service careers of the elite in order to determine which factors played the largest role: ancestry (“heritage”), the presence or absence of a princely title (“estate”), and kinship. The overall conclusion is that the Duma grew less exclusive after 1645, and more and more “new men” joined its ranks. Nevertheless, this process was slow, and most new men had relatives in the Duma ranks. The most important factor for appointment to one of the Duma ranks was “high congenital status,” that is, ancestors and relatives with Duma rank, and a princely title also helped. Poe demonstrates these modest but crucial conclusions with a giant barrage of statistics, charts, and tables. He leaves the reader with little doubt that, within these parameters, the Duma was a hereditary oligarchy whose composition changed very little over the century, adding a minority of new men only slowly. The new men, in his view, came in for two reasons. The court, from which the Duma ranks were drawn, grew from some 2000 men to about 7500 in the course of the century, and included fewer men of “high congenital status.” Thus the tsar had a lower status group from which to choose. The other reason is the weakness of the rulers from 1676 to about 1693, which
encouraged them to seek support by large-scale promotions. These conclusions are too general to explain the specific changes, and Poe himself has elsewhere done better in accounting for the revealing example of the dumnye dvoriane in the reign of Tsar Aleksei (“Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and the Demise of the Romanov Political Settlement,” *Russian Review* [October 2003]).

Poe’s conclusions reflect the limits of statistical methods in explaining the patterns of appointment and promotion. He is brilliant at describing the changes, but to explain them he relies on general circumstances (weakness of the ruler) or on assumptions about the tsar’s motives. Poe’s tsar is a rational manager, and indeed the system as he portrays it has a degree of rationality that inspires doubt in the reader. He calls the ranking system a *cursus honorum*, a term borrowed from Roman history which implies not only a rational structure of offices but a “career,” a progression from lower to higher positions in the course of a lifetime. Yet Poe’s own data contradict this picture: princes, for example, were never appointed to a Duma rank below that of okol’ nichii. Their movement from the second to the first Duma rank was not a career, and, as he also points out, men with low congenital status were promoted slowly, not at all, or not very high. What he is really describing is not a series of careers but the rewards of seniority in an oligarchy slowly modified by appointments from below, but not very far below. Finally, Poe’s work leaves out the contingent but very real reasons for the most crucial appointments and promotions, that is, the play of factions and clan groupings, clients and patrons, and the desire by the tsars (and Sofia) for men they could trust in key positions. By their nature quantitative sources cannot tell us about any of these things, so Poe’s generalizations give us only a very general sketch into which other sources must add the light and color.

That being said, Poe’s accomplishment is great. He provides us with a general framework of the service of the elite in the Duma, and a masterfully constructed and presented research tool in the lists and biographies. The work as a whole is a benchmark in the study of seventeenth-century Russia and an indispensable aid to future historians.

Paul Bushkovitch, Yale University


How have center and periphery interacted in historical and present-day Russia? This is the fundamental question that brings together the diverse essays included in this collection. In his introduction, Richard Stites terms the methodology here “glocalism”—using specific local (understood not just geographically, but also chronologically) studies to answer large “global” questions. It must be said, however, that the main value of these essays will be their illumination of specific issues from the Russian past or present, rather than the building of a coherent methodological model. The essays are of consistently high quality and certainly contribute to our knowledge of historical and present-day diversity in Russia.

Jukka Korpela’s essay on the use of Christian saints for purposes of political integration in Muscovy actually covers a broader period than his title suggests. In fact, many of these “Muscovite” saints were canonized only in the twentieth century. Korpela shows how different rulers used the image and cult of different saints—whose cult often bore little similarity to any historical documentation we have—for their own purposes. His essay contains a wealth of information about specific individuals and cults, and notes the use of saints’ cults in the rhetoric of Moscow’s “holy war” against Islam as well as the extension of Muscovite/Russian power to the northern wilderness. In concluding the essay he notes that Alexander III has recently (2001) been included among a list of saints—but his son, Nicholas II, was not. The rhetoric of present-day canonization would be an interesting topic for a future essay or monograph.
Sergei Bogatyrev’s contribution looks into “integration strategies of the Muscovite monarchy” (p. 59) through the prism of local administration, in particular the guba administration of the sixteenth century. This thorough study with considerable data about the clans who dominated local guba organs provides new information on the governing of Muscovy. Bogatyrev’s long essay is followed by G. V. Ibneyeva’s shorter but no less interesting account of Catherine II’s visit to the Baltic provinces in 1764. Ibneyeva shows that Catherine attempted to intercede in favor of the local peasant population to obtain better conditions for them from their German landlords.

The final three essays here range from the 1920s to the present day. Arto Luukkanen presents interesting theses about the Bolsheviks’ “image of an unimaginable enemy,” to quote the title of his contribution, in particular noting the Bolshevik obsession with religious “enemies.” The collection’s longest essay, by Pekka Kauppala, examines the northern region of Russia from Karelia through the Komi Republic to western Siberian okrugs of Khanty-Mansiysk, Yamal-Nenets, and Taymyr. Kauppala’s emphasis is on the present, in particular the contrast between oil- and gas-rich regions, decaying Soviet industrial cities, and dwindling local, mainly nomadic cultures. At the same time, he provides an excellent ethnographic and historical background on this region, which remains almost unknown to the outside world. Finally, Hanna Smith argues against the prevailing view that Russian policy in the two Chechen wars of the 1990s seriously damaged Russian credibility on the international stage. Rather, she points out, statements of international indignation over Russian violations of human rights in Chechnya have not been matched by serious measures to isolate or diplomatically snub Russia. Certainly, as she points out, Russia’s “rebranding” of its policies in Chechnya as “anti-terrorist,” in particular after 11 September 2001, has been effective in silencing criticism, but she perhaps underestimates the distrust and resentment felt toward Russia by European states and only “papered over” at present.

How does Russian centralism work together with an amazing degree of local diversity? For anyone interested in this fundamental question of Russian politics in the past and present, this collection will be of interest.

Theodore R. Weeks, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale


After an enthusiastic blurb for this book, I have had some second thoughts based on a more careful reading. I still think it a valuable contribution to a sparsely worked segment of the field. Also it is an engaging work to read. The five chapters feature provocative titles, beginning with Catherine I, “The Cinderella from Livland,” then Anna Ioannovna, “The Poor Relative Who Became Empress,” followed by Anna Leopol’dovna, “The Secret Prisoner and Her Children,” Elizabeth, “The Russian Aphrodite,” and finally Catherine II, “The Sovereign of the North.” Anisimov has published on all these personages before in various formats, so his interpretations are hardly surprising. Still, he makes insightful comments about various topics and is not afraid to speculate about some matters, such as whether Catherine I was entirely submissive to Peter the Great and how much of a hands-on ruler Anna Ioannovna really was. Besides, he offers some contradictory assessments of Elizabeth, condemning her treatment of Anna Leopol’dovna and her family and giving her scant respect as a ruler except in foreign policy. His general assessment of the five empresses is offered in the general framework of “the era of palace revolutions,” but he does not link them to Natalia Pushkareva’s “Russian matriarchate” or to my own group suggestion of “Amazon Autocratixes.” The citations show no acquaintance with non-Russian scholarship.

In prose style the book displays Anisimov’s usual sarcastic revisionism in questioning the dominance of Germans during Anna Ioannovna’s reign, lauding Elizabeth’s cultural activities, and praising Catherine the Great’s political insight while giving short shrift to the significance of the
Pugachevshchina. He frequently addresses the reader directly and also indulges in diverting digressions and abrupt transitions. Many prints amplify the text.

The translation, however, suffers from wordiness, awkward phrases, and occasionally misleads the reader by peculiar usages such as Tsaritsyn Lug (p. 171), Courtag (p. 172), and Counter-Admiral (p. 23). It garbles titles of artistic works such as Titus’s Charity for The Clemency of Titus (p. 192) and On Petitmier and the Coquettes instead of On Fops and Coquettes (p. 197), and sometimes misinterprets terms such as horsemen for cavaliers (p. 200). Proper names also get odd spellings, for example Morovich instead of Mirovich (p. 290), Jeoffrin instead of Geoffrin (p. 322 and elsewhere), Chetardy instead of Chétardie (p. 174 and elsewhere), Keyth instead of Keith (p. 274), and Landez or Landai for Landé (pp. 94, 251), the prince of Ligne (p. 241), Posier instead of Pauzié (p. 202), and William of Fermor instead of William Fermor (p. 232). The index is quite defective, too, lacking entries for Amber Room, Araia, Bobrinškoi, Bruce, Brümmer, Chétardie, Derzhavin, Shcherbatov, Shepeleva, Stählin, Sumarokov, and Charles Hanbury Williams, among others. These slips indicate that the translator was not familiar with Russia in the eighteenth century and doing the translation in Russia may have led to spelling errors such as shutter for shudder, spit for split, hurtling instead of hurling, and illogical for alogical. Some dates are off, beginning with Catherine II’s birthday and when she first met Melchior Grimm. This is hardly the “first-rate translation” (p. vii) for which Anisimov thanks the translator. His scholarly popular book deserved better.

John T. Alexander, University of Kansas


As the title suggests, this book undertakes the monumental task of examining the influence of war and military service on women’s daily lives from the eighteenth century to the end of the Imperial period—a daunting goal when one considers that Russia was rarely wholly at peace during these years. Shcherbinin uses a wide variety of sources to explore his topic—laws, archival documents, and military regulations and records to look at the impact of military service throughout the period, as well as letters, petitions, proverbs, and laments to understand how people of various ranks perceived military service, responded to it, and structured their lives around it or in spite of it.

The first section of the book concentrates on soldatki and their families, and the author provides the most complete picture to date of their lives. The well-known character of the unhappy soldatka, trapped in the home of her in-laws, certainly figures prominently in Shcherbinin’s book, and he examines the popular equation of soldatki with prostitution as well. But his discussion of the soldatka also highlights the variety of ways in which women responded to their situation—some followed their husbands whenever possible, others left the village to seek work in a town or a city, and still others became soldatka by choice, marrying a soldier. He further discusses the particular challenges that legitimate and illegitimate children, particularly daughters, of soldatki faced and the various methods that they and their mothers implemented to survive. He explores not only their interaction with in-laws, military authorities, and the police, but also the role of the church in shaping the legal and moral parameters of soldiers’ wives and families. Finally, he examines how changes in a soldier’s status (indefinite leave, for example) affected the lives of wives and children. Shcherbinin’s work emphasizes the diversity of soldatki and their families in different times, places, and circumstances.

The second part of the book centers on the period after the military reforms of 1874 and concentrates on the families of the reserve soldiers during periods of war and peace. He explores how the reforms affected soldatki and their families, pointing out that the financial hardship was still severe and that soldatki lost the right to accompany their husbands for the six years of active service, which Shcherbinin links to further increases in the occurrence of venereal diseases among
soldiers and their wives. In general, he concludes that the reforms did little to improve the lot of the soldatki and their children, and in some ways, made their lives more difficult than before. Part II then covers, in much more detail, several of the major recruiting periods up through World War I and discusses the impact of changes and continuities in Russian society and in recruiting practices on the lives of soldatki, their families, and women in general (for example, women workers who took over traditionally masculine jobs in industry).

Part III discusses women who were part of or attached to the military during war—nurses in the Crimean, Turkish, Russo-Japanese, and First World Wars; female soldiers throughout the period; and independent women’s organizations created to support various war efforts. In this section, Shcherbinin explores not only women’s experiences in these arenas but also reactions to them from male soldiers and the government. The section on nurses is excellent, providing details on training, use of nurses in the various actions, and perceptions of them in society. The sections on women in the military and women’s organizations is more cursory, but provides a good general overview of women in these activities.

This is the first book to attempt to explore issues of women and the military over so large a period of Russian history and is a mine of information on these topics, which are often neglected in more general works on women or the military in late Imperial Russia. Historians will find it not only a useful resource, but also an interesting addition to the literature on Russian women’s history.

Greta Bucher, U.S. Military Academy at West Point


In the 1840s, intellectuals living in imperial tsarist provinces north of the Black Sea began thinking of the territory situated between the Bug, Prypriat, and Donets rivers as “Ukraine.” During the following decades their followers argued for the inclusion of detailed accounts of “Ukraine’s” past into the established Imperial Russian grand narrative of national history. By the beginning of the next century they were claiming their regional past was not part of a larger whole but a separate national history in its own right that should be excluded from Russian national history. One consequence of this “nationalization” was the idea that the principality of Kyiv-Rus was “Ukrainian” rather than “Russian” and that “Russian history” did not begin on the northern Black Sea littoral or banks of the Dnipro river, but in the Volga-Oka basin. While few Russians saw things this way, by the 1920s all educated Ukrainians did. The key person behind this development was Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and he is the subject of the reviewed book, which focuses on the years 1890–1934.

Plokhy’s account of Hrushevsky’s role in nationalizing the past of a part of Eastern Europe into “Ukrainian history,” thereby “unmaking Imperial Russia,” is truly, as advertised, a fine piece of scholarship. A nuanced, complex analysis that cannot be summarized in a short review, his book is heavily detailed and intended primarily for specialists. Yet it is eminently readable, free of trendy jargon, focuses rigorously on its theme, and will be understood by anyone interested. Particularly valuable are the discussions of Pavel Miliukov’s and Mikhail Pokrovsky’s role in “nationalizing” the grand narrative of Russian history. Shortcomings, like Plokhy’s questionable use of “intelligentsia” for “the educated,” “deconstruct” for “reject” or “criticize,” and the absence of a few relevant works from his bibliography, are trivial and do not weaken the argument. A discussion of how professionalization throughout Europe did not necessarily make scholarship less political, and whether Hrushevsky’s paradigm provides a better way of understanding the past than does the traditional grand narrative of Russian history, might have been worthwhile, however.

The underlying theme of Plokhy’s book is the relationship between evidence and interpretation in historical writing. In National History as Cultural Process (1992) I argued that Russian, Polish,
and Ukrainian historians who wrote grand narratives were all more influenced in the final analysis by the prevailing intellectual and political climate than research. Plokhy supports that conclusion. After closely examining the interaction between evidence and paradigm he adds that Hrushevsky strove to be as intellectually honest as he possibly could.

Since research has a minimal impact on interpretive shifts in grand narratives of national history we should not be surprised that, regardless of Hrushevsky's scholarship, most of Russia's historians still do not think that he “unmade Imperial Russia” and still doubt the validity of Ukraine's grand narrative of national history. Perhaps this should not be so, but it is. In most survey accounts “Russian history” still begins with the “Kievan period,” “Russians” still inhabit Kiev, and in some, Ukraine and Russia still “reunited” in 1654. Russia's historians, in short, do not exclude Ukrainian territory from their accounts. The first four parts of the seventh edition of Riasanovsky's A History of Russia (2005), for instance, are the same as they were in his first edition (1963). In both, the chapter “Russia before the Russians” includes this claim: “As an introduction to Russian history proper, we must turn to the northern shore of the Black Sea [sic].” (p. 10, 7th ed.; p. 11, 1st ed.). The Volga-Oka basin does not appear until chapter 11 and we are told nothing about what happened there before 1147. Leaving aside doubts concerning the adequacy of national history as a category of analysis in general, the latest edition of Riasanovsky's influential text, like almost all histories of Russia written during the last one hundred years, shows how unlikely it is that Plokhy's or anyone else's demonstration of the logic and scholarly rigor of Hrushevsky's account of Eastern Slavic history will do anything to convert the unconverted.

What will change views and interpretations is the existence of the independent Ukrainian state. When Hrushevsky's works attaching the Kievan legacy to Ukrainian history first appeared at the beginning of the last century Russian historians ignored them. Indeed, his vociferous critics were bilingual Ukrainian-born “empire-loyalists” (pp. 111–13,149–50). Even Pokrovsky did not consistently distinguish between Russia and its empire in his grand narrative. His one-volume history of Russia, written in 1919–20, when Russia did not control Ukraine, was arguably more a reflection of his intellectual acceptance of political reality than of Hrushevsky's ideas, and he later regretted that his book focused on ethnic Russia. By 1929 he had sided with Stalin and was advocating a Russocentric version of Soviet history. As noted a generation ago in volume IV of the New Cambridge Modern History, political events like national independence should, ideally, not influence historians, but in real life they do. We should conclude, therefore, that it is only a matter of time before the existence of a state that controls the territory they claim should be part of their national history provokes Russia's historians to finish the job of nationalizing its past in light of what Hrushevsky wrote. Accordingly, we should all patiently await the eighth edition of Riasanovsky's survey.

Stephen Velychenko, University of Toronto


The starting point of Häfner's study about “society as local organization” is the influential thesis of Dietrich Geyer about Russian society since the late eighteenth century as “state organization” (Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas [1966]), and the related question of whether a Russian “bourgeoisie” or a “civil society” developed in the nineteenth century, as in Western Europe. Häfner takes up this complicated cause and pleads for the concept of “local society” to find access to the social and cultural development of the urban population in the Russian province. Kazan' and Saratov, both of which are located at the middle course of the Volga river, serve as examples with the right degrees of common and varying features to guarantee comparability and representativity. In his outstandingly researched study the author concludes that in the aftermath
of the Great Reforms Russian cities developed a specific trans-estate social formation, one which
marked a counterpart to the autocratic state and thus outgrew the conception of society as state
organization. This “local society” was an exclusive circle of not more than 2 percent of the city
population, which defined itself in different degrees by material independence, inclination to social
activity and initiative of one’s own, interest in common weal, education, cultural values, and last
but not least, sociability. Such value systems of the urban elites, however, could not prevail on a
broad national level, but were crushed between the intransigence of autocracy and the fundamentally
different lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) of the peasant-proletarian majority, which never acquired the
social and cultural concepts of the upper strata.

There is no denying that Häfner comes from social history. An amazing richness of material,
innumerable names, facts, and data serve the scrupulous portrayal of the socioeconomic structure
of local society, as well as its manifestations in the press, in associations, in local politics, and in
the sphere of culture. Häfner’s inclination to a solid methodical grounding of his observations as
well as his comprehensive conceptual considerations prove him to be a disciple of theoretically
informed historical social science. But the author also firmly pursues the cultural extension of the
questions of social history, which finds its expression in his taking up of categories like social
practices, communication processes, rituals, cultural norms, and values. Häfner continuously makes
efforts to elaborate the “cultural dimension of sociable life as essential constituent of a socialization
of segmented, diverse, materially and non-materially heterogenic configurations” with the aim of
coming closer to the phenomenon of local society (p. 174).

Häfner’s work is impressive in different respects: it is grounded in an immense amount of
sources, which the author treats with admirable meticulousness. His wide knowledge of literature
is just as enviable as his degree of methodical reflection (although Häfner is tempted to completely
overload the notes and to reprimand colleagues for, as he sees it, their inadequate argumentation).
Stylistically the text ranges on a high, although occasionally very complex level. In content the
study conveys a lasting and masterly picture of the elites of upper urban society in the late tsarist
empire. But even if the central theme of “local society” holds the study together, the observations
seem somewhat anonymous and fragmentary. Although countless persons are mentioned, they
remain anonymous bit players in Häfner’s presentation of local society. Of course, it was not the
author’s intent to write a collective biography. Nevertheless, at some points I would have preferred
an individualizing compression, which would have made the image of the *Lebenswelt* of urban
elites still more illustrative and concrete.

But this minor point of criticism does not alter the fact that we are dealing with a fundamental
work which presents the sluggish but steady sociocultural change in tsarist Russia on a local level.
Avoiding occupied and unfitting concepts like “bourgeoisie” or “civil society,” Häfner is able to
show how under the specific conditions of autocracy a remarkable emancipation of the urban
population from the state took place, which led to various enrichments of life. His book truly
represents a landmark in making comprehensive prerevolutionary Russian society. Its elites showed
more common features with Western Europe than the autocratic state makes us believe; the general
set-up of Russian society, however, ensured that even the achievements of local society could not
prevent the downfall of old Russia.

Matthias Stadelmann, University of Erlangen/Nuremberg, Germany


A large, disorganized country beset by ethnic and social tension is hit hard by terrorists. The
security forces do not share important information; no central agency coordinates efforts to stop
the attackers. But the authorities have considerable funds and dedicated people (even if their
numbers steadily decline), while the radicals are pathetically amateurish and divided; thus the security forces all but destroy terrorism. But while they are winning daily battles, the state they work for loses the war for public opinion. This is the essence of Jonathan Daly’s story. It happened again to the East German Stasi, as he notes; it may happen to other security agencies.

All students of Russian history are familiar with the outlines of Daly’s subject, but he adds much to our knowledge of how the tsarist authorities and their opposition, from the Kadets leftward, operated. There is important new information on the wide spread of perlustration after 1905 and on charges of torture, which cannot quite be pinned down but have the ring of accuracy. Daly finds that right-wing terrorism has been overestimated and details attempts to reform the security police after 1912. The tale of how the security forces successfully disabled revolutionary organizations is fleshed out considerably. Worthwhile vignettes enhance the book; for example, in 1916, Prime Minister B. V. Shturmer hated E. K. Klimovich, director of the Police Department, and refused to give him any directives, while retaining him in office.

The constantly shifting cast is sometimes hard to absorb; Gerasimovs and Globachevs mix together despite Daly’s valiant efforts to describe the faces, characters, and habits of the major policemen. But this game of concentration is needed: the tsarist government, even before Rasputin’s interference began, lacked the stability of cadres necessary to rule effectively. The regime gradually ran out of policies to try and effective people to try them. A crucial case in point is that of a gendarme captain who ordered the shooting of peaceful strikers at the Lena Goldfields in 1912; he acted against the wishes of the provincial governor, and apparently the officer had no business commanding troops there in the first place. As former minister of justice I. G. Shcheglovitov put it in 1916, “in our monarchy there is only a handful of monarchists” (p. 180).

Still, Daly wonders if the government might have survived by making key concessions, in particular by abolishing administrative exile and the laws of August 1881 that provided for heightened security measures and local rule by centrally appointed officials. But this is like asking why Hitler couldn’t be nicer to the Russians, and Daly quickly backs away from his own query. He suggests that broadening the political process could not have staved off revolution.

The final pages condemn Soviet security practices, which supposedly grew out of the new regime’s intention “to fashion a new society and a new human being” (p. 225). Daly’s detailed statistics on the number of people arrested in the last decade of tsarism for state crimes underscore existing knowledge that Soviet practice was vastly more lethal. Yet one might object that mass education, upward social mobility, patriotism, and loyalty to the family were Communist, but not new, objectives in Russia.

Watchful State is a good read for the rich detail and remarkable stories of human foibles—and dedication—it offers. Daly achieves a new level of understanding of why the best security in the world may not offset profound political trends.

Robert W. Thurston, Miami University


Imperial Russia, Davis and Trani argue, had never been of much interest to Americans. The trade treaty of 1832, its abrogation in 1913, as well as the purchase of Alaska in 1867 were just minor exceptions in an otherwise unbroken pattern of disinterest. Readers of Norman Saul’s *Distant Friends* and *Concord and Conflict* will encounter a very different interpretation of these matters. However, U.S. relations with the empire of the Romanovs are not the focus of the work under review here.

The central argument of this book is that “[President Woodrow] Wilson, [Secretary of State Robert] Lansing, and [subsequent Secretary of State Bainbridge] Colby helped lay the foundations
for the later Cold War and policy of containment. There was no military confrontation, armed standoff, or arms race. Yet certain basics were there: suspicion, mutual misunderstandings, dislike, fear, ideological hostility, and diplomatic isolation” (p. 202). “It is possible,” the authors conclude, “to draw a relatively straight line from Wilson and his collaborators down to [George] Kennan and [Ronald] Reagan. The Wilsonians were the first cold warriors, and in the era of Wilson the first cold war began” (p. 206). This is not an entirely novel thesis. William Appleman Williams, Arno Mayer, David Foglesong, and others have advanced similar interpretations of early Soviet-American conflict.

Davis and Trani are quite critical of President Wilson and his administration. They find him ignorant of Russia, disinterested in Russian affairs, sluggish in response to the developing crisis after the February Revolution, and inept at formulating and executing policies appropriate to deal with the situation. Wilson had lost confidence in his ambassador in St. Petersburg, David Francis, and therefore elaborated policy through cumbersome ad hoc committees (for example, the Root Mission and the Stevens Railway Commission), resulting in delay and confusion when prompt and decisive action was urgently required. This situation also created opportunities for various Americans of disparate backgrounds and responsibilities (such as, William Judson, Maddin Summers, Raymond Robins, Edgar Sisson) to pursue clashing objectives in Russia. The authors conclude that “Wilson lost an opportunity to save Russian democracy because of his committees’ and ambassador’s confusing advice and his own tentativeness” (p. xxi). That judgment is hard to accept. Given the rapidly deteriorating economic situation and the growing estrangement between the Provisional Government and the workers and soldiers of Petrograd, it would have taken a lot more than Woodrow Wilson’s eloquence to save liberal democracy in Russia. The opportunity of “gargantuan proportions” which the authors posit simply did not exist. Similarly, their suggestion that a more astute policy of constructive engagement with the Bolshevik regime in February of 1918 might have prevented the Peace of Brest-Litovsk seems dubious. It is hard to imagine the war-weary and virtually prostrate Russian nation continuing to make epic sacrifices in order to relieve pressure on the Western front.

Much of this story is well known, since so many previous writers have chronicled the origins of Soviet-America relations. The authors’ exploration of the ideological determinants of Wilsonian foreign policy is useful, as is their elaboration of beliefs, perceptions, and responses in the period 1917–21 which bear such remarkable similarities to those of the post-World War II era. Readers will learn something about the evolution of American policy toward Russia during that troubled time, but next to nothing about Soviet policy. This work is based on extensive archival research and a broad survey of the secondary literature. It contains a long and somewhat idiosyncratic historiographical essay, and its bibliography inexplicably omits some very relevant works (for instance, the writings of Richard Debo).

Teddy J. Uldricks, University of North Carolina at Asheville


The events of October 1917 did not become “The October Revolution” until the Bolshevik revolutionaries who came to power undertook a concerted effort to make it so. This is the thesis of Frederick C. Corney’s excellent new book, *Telling October*. As Corney demonstrates convincingly, there were originally multiple versions of the story, focusing respectively on the Smolny Institute, the weaknesses of the Provisional Government, the mass nature of the uprising, and only belatedly on “the taking” of the Winter Palace. Many, indeed the majority, of the early accounts did not highlight a leading role for the Bolshevik party in these events.

Whether this was even a revolution was perhaps the most contested question in the early years (and to this day), since the Bolsheviks’ opponents consistently characterized the events as a
The coup d’etat instead of a revolution. Ironically, the early Bolshevik cultural leaders were so busy trying to show the broad base of the revolution that they initially ignored the role of the party itself. Only with time did Istpart, the arm of the party charged with developing materials on the history of the party and of the revolution, begin to create a narrative centered in the party itself.

_Telling October_ is important because it contributes to both cultural and institutional history. In terms of the latter, Corney describes the insecurities of the local Istpart organizations, their difficulties taking the lead in making decisions. This, I have found, is a crucial part of the early Bolshevik landscape, since those at the periphery were always writing to the center asking for instructions. Culturally the book suggests the importance of examining specific actors and their different agendas in trying to put together histories of events that have just taken place with archives, monuments, celebrations, and written accounts.

My principal concern about the book is the question of agency. In one or two places Corney himself notes that it is impossible to know the motivations of those involved in writing this foundation narrative: whether they were altruistic or instrumental, deceptive or self-deceptive, or neither. Yet I would have loved to hear more about the rewards available to those who chose to work in Istpart and its affiliates. Was this a path of advancement for those involved? What about the problem of self-censorship and of instrumental involvement in the Istpart project? When did participants delete parts of their narratives? And what about the opposite—examples of people narrating events to fit what they knew the authorities wanted to hear, perhaps without any regard at all for what might have actually happened? A second, related concern with the book is Corney’s frequently stated assumption that the authors, theater directors, and others involved in this project were striving for “coherence.” I am not entirely convinced that this was always their primary motivation. Other possible motivations could have been mobilizing the masses to tell some kind of story so that they (the masses) would feel engaged (Corney argues this theoretically but doesn’t show it as convincingly as I would have liked); mobilizing the masses and especially the intellectuals so they would have what might be called “busy work” and would not look too critically at what the regime was doing; or settling old scores (again, this is something Corney occasionally mentions, but without sufficiently showing how pervasive—and pernicious—it was, as each of the principal characters such as Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky all made concerted efforts to write each other out of the story for completely presentist reasons having nothing to do with telling a coherent story in and of itself).

These few reservations aside, this is an important book and one well worth reading. The institutionalization of the memories of October had to be carefully managed, as Corney shows. His book is an excellent antidote to both Soviet and Western accounts which simply focus on the Military Revolutionary Committee, as if the Bolshevik party made the October Revolution in ten days. Rather, as the reader will find out, it was the memories of the October Revolution that had to be carefully crafted.

__Elizabeth A. Wood, M.I.T.__


In the last ten years, research about Stalinism has focused on the question of how the individual behaved under Soviet conditions and how the New Man was formed. Historians preferred using a subjective perspective in seeking to find out how human beings reacted to terror, propaganda, and uprooting. Ingo Grabowsky’s main interest is not the individual, but the propaganda administration that was created to fashion the New Man. With his dissertation thesis, written at the Lotman-Institute in Bochum, he submits a structural and organizational history of the agitprop section of the Central Committee (CC) from its foundation in 1920 to its reorganization in 1928. Grabowsky
sought to investigate “the development, structure and function of this section” (p. 12), and the result is a history of the authorities, listing precisely every stage of development, every organizational reform, and every authority leader, and extensively quoting circulars, instructions, and resolutions. “Until today there is no monograph about the section of agitprop,” explains Grabowsky as to why he wrote this book (p. 14). He investigates the development of the agitprop section not only in the center but also in the provinces of Vologda and Nizhnii Novgorod, having conducted extensive archival research. But the more precisely we are informed about the ramifications of the authorities, the more we miss a guiding question, interpretation, and a main thesis.

Grabowsky aims to prove that the institutions were “by no means always regrouped with consideration of efficiency,” but nobody would have expected that, and the point seems to be banal. That his study focuses on “the plausibility or non-plausibility of the different stages of development of the organs” is unsatisfactory, for he does not explain what kind of “plausibility” he is suggesting (p. 12). We do not learn very much about the people involved, the party leaders, cadres, teachers, and students. The students drank, shattered toilet bowls, stole light bulbs, and spit out sunflower seeds. We already knew that the teachers were hardly trained and that there were too few of them. Grabowsky does not tell us anything about the protagonists of agitprop, Katanjan, Vardin, Bubnov and so on: neither their background and biography, nor their aims. They remain variables in a great structure. But the study becomes exciting when Grabowsky brings in Stalin, who in 1921 first subjugated the editorial board of the Izvestia TsK and then the entire agitprop apparatus, where he installed his men to control the press and the propaganda. Unfortunately, Grabowsky only partly succeeds in explaining how Stalin used the parallel structures of party and state—on the one side the agitprop section of the CC, on the other side the committee for enlightenment (glavpoliprossvet) under Krupskaia at the Commissariat of Enlightenment “to establish his power, to strengthen the organization and to eliminate his rivals. In 1927, Krupskaia and the leadership of glavpoliprossvet gave up in frustration and resigned. Grabowsky fails to take the opportunity to portray the different competing departments and sections as a chessboard, on which Stalin positioned his figures and made his moves. Nor does he write a history of the authorities to show by which principles the parallel structures of state and party, and the extremely frequent reorganizations, functioned. Grabowsky himself is uncertain how to interpret this phenomenon. At one point he explains that “to solve a new problem, the CC created a new apparatus” (p. 84), then claims that “the reorganization of the CC apparatus in 1928 was mainly motivated by economic reasons” (p. 130). But in the end he concludes that, as opposed to Nazi Germany, the creation of parallel structures was not a strategy of power but the expression of a helpless expansion of institutions as an answer to political problems (p. 334). Thus Grabowsky submits a structural history of the agitprop section without explaining why we need this kind of history.

Susanne Schattenberg, Humboldt-University Berlin


Anyone who spent time dealing with the bureaucratic, institutional, and cultural difficulties presented by travel to and within the old postwar USSR, and who may have wondered how other travelers had fared in earlier, more difficult times, will find in this book an exhaustive answer to their questions. This revised dissertation examines the evolution of the tourist industry in Soviet Russia up to Nazi Germany’s invasion in 1941. It centers on German (and some Austrian) travelers who were drawn to the Communist state during this period for many different reasons. As the author points out, Soviet Russia was certainly attractive to many Communists and leftists of the
Weimar Republic, although this attraction did not extend to all social democrats. Nor did Soviet Russia repel all conservative circles, some of which advocated close cooperation with it for economic and foreign policy reasons. The German and Austrian visitors to Soviet Russia during the 1920s and 1930s examined in this volume were engaged in a process of “self-assurance or self-criticism” of their own culture in relation to the East (p. 1). When the Nazis came to power, however, this rich encounter with the Soviet state was replaced by a polarized anti-Semitic caricature of it.

Acknowledging the prevalent attitude that such travel accounts invariably told more about the traveler than the destination, Heeke argues that the travel account genre specifically in the Soviet case has been undervalued by historians, if embraced by literary scholars for precisely the former reason. Heeke is interested in the identities and attitudes of these travelers, and why they were engaged in this “political tourism” at different times (p. 8). He examines the motivations of all comers, including journalists, businessmen, engineers, government elites, artists, sports delegations, students, and “simple tourists.” He is interested in the evolution over time of both the traveler and the travelers’ destination. He seeks to undergird his examination of the travelers’ perceptions with his own study of the travelers’ immediate world, for example the preparations undertaken by the travelers, the towns and regions they visited, their lengths of stay, how much freedom of movement they had, the contacts they had while there, the restrictions on their daily lives, and so forth. His description of the travelers’ cosmos is both broad and deep. A significant part of the book is devoted to a detailed and interesting analysis of the development of the tourist infrastructure in Soviet Russia and the goals of the Soviet government vis-à-vis such foreign tourism. Such organizations as the All-Union Society for Cultural Links Abroad and especially Intourist (the official Soviet travel agency) receive much attention in his study.

The researcher will find much of value in this voluminous and richly detailed analysis of German and Austrian travelers’ accounts to Soviet Russia. The appendices contain detailed biographies of them, an excellent bibliography of published primary and secondary sources, and a detailed listing of the many archival sources consulted. Unfortunately, the volume lacks an index.

Frederick Corney, The College of William and Mary


This volume is based on the 2001 joint conference of Ruhr University and the Russian “Memorial” Society. It is not, however, a random combination of archival-research and oral-history papers but a systematic presentation of data available on the “Society of Political Prisoners and Exiles” that was formed in Moscow in 1921 and liquidated in 1935, when the Great Terror was gaining momentum.

In the 1920s, despite the attacks it endured from the authorities within a year of its establishment, this organization grew and spread to other major cities and to Siberia. Initially, it accepted old Bolsheviks as well as Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries (SR), and anarchists; at the end of the decade it was taken over by regime loyalists. The aims of the society were the historiography of the revolutionary movements in tsarist times, memorialization of these movements, contacts with members of socialist movements abroad, and moral and material support of the people who had participated in socialist and anarchist activities before October 1917 and were imprisoned or exiled to Siberia by the tsarist government. The society published the journal Katorga i ssylka (Hard-Labor Prisons and Exile), set up museum exhibitions, organized educational guided tours for the public, sent its members to rest-cures in sanatoria, founded and ran minor factories, workshops, and farms to solve the problem of the members’ unemployment, and assigned pensions and food-rations. The incentives for joining the society ranged from purely ideological to purely financial. Before the first decade was over, however, the society became a means for police
control of the former revolutionaries—by infiltrating their ranks and turning denunciation into a virtue. Membership requirements were tightened; a renewed registration of the members (that is, a purge) was held. Solidarity with members repressed by the Soviet power was first strongly discouraged and then plainly banned. In the middle and late thirties the majority of the members (once a rebel, always a rebel) were imprisoned or shot. A small minority survived to see the Thaw of the mid-fifties. One of the most moving accusatory documents against the organization quoted in the collection is the letter by the anarchist Olga Taratuta, announcing her break with the organization: “I refuse to belong to a society divided into masters and slaves, where the former use arbitrary violent methods to pursue political aims alien to the society and the latter, guided by motives that are, at best, not revolutionary, submit to them, voicelessly grumbling” (p. 89).

Diligently as the purged and reformed society toed the political line of the thirties, it was still a repository of memories that conflicted with Stalin’s rewriting of history. One of the papers of the collection deals with the summer-house cooperative that the society established shortly before its dissolution: many of the members moved not into the dachas but into prisons and camps. Some of the luckiest died a natural death before the Great Terror: many of them were cremated (a revolutionary procedure initiated by the society) and buried in a columbarium in the Donskoe Cemetery in Moscow.

The articles of the collection are based on a great quantity of archival data on the history of the society and the fate of its members. The deployment of the data dominates analytic and interpretive touches, as if to steer clear of speculation. It is rather a pity, however, that the collection is methodologically self-enclosed, that no effort is made to inscribe its research explicitly into the existing historiography of the Soviet regime—into more than half a century of Western historical studies of the Soviet regime.

Leona Toker, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem


In his meticulous study of the documentation surrounding the development of the Gulag, Oleg Khlevniuk raises a number of key questions related to this defining institution—an institution which he refers to as an “almost direct reflection” of Soviet history itself (p. 8). He records official directives, orders, decrees, and correspondence, and goes on to reveal their intended and unintended consequences. Khlevniuk concludes that the terror was centrally directed, that “mass repressions started and ended on orders from above” (p. 331), and that the Gulag spread beyond the barbed wire to affect Soviet society at large—in culture, behavior, and outlook. He further asserts that the “harshness of the laws generated the habit of circumventing them” (p. 343). Indeed, the chronic ailments of unlawful authority, coupled with a reciprocal disrespect for the law and underdeveloped notions of individual responsibility and culpability, may well be part of the Gulag’s legacy.

There were often contradictory directives from Moscow that were not expected to be widely followed. Such was an order of 9 June 1933, issued by Berman (head of the Gulag), prescribing adequate rest and days off for emaciated prisoners. However, such directives were accompanied by warnings about prisoners’ faking illnesses, and production plans remained unaltered. Repression was compounded by famine, and in early 1933, Khlevniuk argues, the Gulag was rapidly taking on an “exterminatory” character. He questions the reliability of Gulag statistics on death rates, since those who did not actually die in the camps were not counted. In fact, many prisoners died en route to the camps, or were released so ill that they never reached their destination. According to Khlevniuk, this group may well have comprised tens of thousands of prisoners. After 1933 repression abated somewhat and the system stabilized. During this relative period of stability, in the aftermath
of the Kirov assassination, the accusatory bias of the Procuracy increased. Later, as “socialist legality” developed, chekists would be in charge of investigating their own crimes, and prisoners’ complaints would go directly to the accused.

Order no. 00447 of July 1937 sanctioned the physical liquidation of “anti-Soviet elements.” In his discussion of the consequences of this decree, Khlevniuk is unambiguous and uses terminology generally reserved to describe the Nazi camps. He explicitly refers to the Gulag in this period as “extermination camps,” and he terms the newly created forest camps of 1937 “provisional death camps” (p. 178). Large numbers of those who were not immediately shot were moved from overcrowded prisons and colonies to camps equally unable to accommodate them. The authorities were well aware of the conditions in the camps, even as stated in a February 1938 memorandum from Vyshinsky to Yezhov, in which the former characterizes camp conditions as “absolutely intolerable” (p. 173).

Khlevniuk cites numerous examples of how crises in the camps manifested themselves in this period. For instance, groups of prisoners could not work, because they were “unclothed.” “One can only imagine,” he notes, “what being officially unclothed meant in the Gulag, where nobody was well dressed” (p. 180). In September 1938, the author cites, there were 2 million prisoners in the prisons and colonies, but only 422,000 pairs of shoes and 213,000 pairs of felt boots. Such problems were obviously only the tip of the iceberg. Not only were prisoners in no condition to work, but many of the projects on which they were forced to labor, such as railway lines or unused roads, were worthless anyway. Khlevniuk presents this and other evidence of how the “Gulag economy was more of a financial burden than a generator of income” (p. 337).

Occasionally, in the course of this well-documented work, Khlevniuk ventures into generalizations which he does not subject to sufficient analysis. For example, he supports the position that family ties were strengthened rather than weakened by the repression, because a convicted family member rendered the whole family vulnerable to persecution. However, the longer-term consequences of the arrest of a family member tended to be the break up and atomization of the family. Family reunion was the first priority for most returnees, but very few families successfully reunited. Some of the other suppositions set forth in this work are indeed instrumental to our understanding of the place of the Gulag, but they are not well synthesized with the documentation. In terms of format, Khlevniuk has selected 106 quite relevant documents, but it is not always clear where the document ends and where the author’s text begins.

These caveats aside, Khlevniuk’s *History of the Gulag* is a solid reference work covering an enormous range of underexplored issues raised by the Gulag, including its impact on Soviet society. It makes an important contribution in our search to understand this integral mechanism of the Soviet system.

Nanci Adler, University of Amsterdam


The result of a 1998 conference at Copenhagen, this volume offers twelve contributions of varying quality; all are distinguished by the use of archival sources. The first half of the book, “The System: Structure and Function,” emphasizes domestic politics. Graeme Gill’s chapter describes a fundamental tension between the “personalist principle and pressures for organizational norms” throughout Soviet history (p. 10). Terror, enthusiasm, and Stalin’s personal role ameliorated this tension; the absence of all three factors in the post-Stalin period led to the decline of the political system. By contrast, Irina Pavlova’s disjointed contribution (“The Strength and Weakness of Stalin’s Power”) focusing primarily on the early 1920s promises more than it delivers. Nonetheless, its brief overview of the development of secrecy rules in the party-state is useful. Niels Erik
Rosenfeldt’s contribution updates his longstanding work on Stalin’s secret apparatus and summarizes the functions of this institution. Rosenfeldt wisely notes that the new archival revelations need to be compared to older memoir accounts, but a churlish insistence on declaring victory over the “revisionists” of the 1980s undermines his advice. Peter Huber’s chapter describes the structure of the Comintern apparatus in Moscow, while Vladimir Poznyakov offers a fine, but too brief, survey of the workings of the Soviet intelligence community in the Stalin period, giving more attention to its successes than its failures. The first half of the volume concludes with Gennady Borduoghov’s compelling narrative of “The Transformation of the Policy of Extraordinary Measures into a Permanent System of Government.” Fundamental to this process was a redefinition of socialism as monolithic and state-centered in the period of Stalin’s “Revolution from Above.”

The contributions in the second half of the volume (“Foreign Policy: Aspects of Decisionmaking and Communication”) are stronger. Vladimir Nevezhin surveys the propaganda apparatus from 1939 to 1941, just hinting at the issue of preparing the army and the Soviet population for an offensive war that has been the principal subject of his scholarship. Vladimir Baryshnikov’s informative short review of the Soviet decision to attack Finland in 1940 describes how the Soviet leadership’s perception of the country changed, along with the general political climate in Europe, in the mid-1930s. Rikke Haue’s chapter on Narkomindel materials on Denmark from the mid-1930s will mainly be of interest to historians of Soviet-Danish relations. By contrast, Bent Jensen’s analysis of the role of the island of Bornholm in Soviet-Danish relations is a fascinating case study in Soviet manipulation of European fears during the Cold War, and would serve as an interesting addition to a course on Soviet foreign policy. Kathryn Weathersby contributes a chapter on Soviet policymaking on Korea; her account of Soviet-North Korean economic relations argues for the paramount role of ideology in establishing an unequal trade relationship between the two states. The volume concludes with Vojtech Mastny’s excellent history of the formation of the Warsaw Pact. Relying on a variety of Soviet and East-European archives, Mastny shows that the establishment of the alliance followed more from diplomatic concerns of the moment than from military strategy.

The editors perform a service in bringing the work of several Russian scholars to an English-speaking audience. The volume as a whole fails to live up to the praise of Robert C. Tucker’s short forward, in which he claims that it is “essential to our deeper comprehension of twentieth century Russia” (p. viii). A lengthier introduction might have served to make the volume more coherent. Nevertheless, a patient reader will find value here.

Peter A. Blitstein, Lawrence University


Nikolai Ezhov headed the NKVD, the Soviet political police, at the height of the Great Purges. From 9 September 1936 to 23 November 1938, he presided over the arrest of 1.5 million individuals for nonexistent political crimes and the execution of 702,656 of them, most of which were crammed into a time period of little more than fifteen months. Yet until now we have lacked a serious archive-based study of the man who carried out the Great Terror. The authors of this work, Marc Jansen, a historian at the University of Amsterdam’s Institute of Russian and East European Studies, and Nikolai V. Petrov, the Vice-Chairman of the Memorial Society’s Scientific Research Center in Moscow, are eminently qualified to assess Ezhov’s eventful life and career. Their study rests on a large body of research conducted by the leaders of the Moscow Memorial Society as official representatives of the illfated Russian Parliament (1990–93) in archives that remain essentially closed to scholars—the Central Archive of the FSB and the Presidential Archive.
The result is a full-length biography of Ezhov that begins with his birth in 1895, ends with his execution in 1940, and focuses largely on Ezhov’s role during the Great Purges. However, the authors of what is the best documented study to date of one of the architects of the Great Terror have chosen for some strange reason to accept interrogation data, obtained from Ezhov and other purged NKVD officers under torture, as more valid data than less sensational information, like the biographical data submitted throughout Ezhov’s long political career whenever he registered at party congresses or went through various party purges and screenings. Therefore this work tells us that Ezhov was born in Lithuania, not St. Petersburg, in a family of a brothel owner, not a factory worker, and presents us with all sorts of sordid details of his homosexual relationships, derived from interrogation information collected by the zealous NKVD, which accounts for 14 percent of the footnotes in this book! To be sure, such sensational data is exceedingly tempting for historians to use, as I have noted in my own research, since it, unlike similar information collected during the Western witch hunts, never mentions the methods utilized to extract such testimony!

The authors also try overly hard at times to fit the bizarre career of Nikolai Ezhov into standard Western interpretations of the Great Terror by presenting him throughout as “Stalin’s loyal executioner,” even as Ezhov was accumulating private dossiers on Stalin’s closest associates in the Politburo (like Molotov) along with files of sensitive information on Stalin’s revolutionary career and relationship with the tsarist Okhrana. The voluntary evaluations of a series of officials who worked closely with Ezhov assert that from the mid-1920s on he often did not know when to stop and easily got out of control are simply dismissed out of hand.

Nonetheless, this book, when read critically, provides a great deal of important information, derived from archives that are once again inaccessible, on how the NKVD functioned under Ezhov. As such, this pioneering, engrossing work is required reading for all those interested in Stalinism and the Great Purges, and would make an excellent addition to graduate and undergraduate research and method courses. Perhaps Stalin’s Loyal Executioner could inspire a long overdue discussion of just how scholars should utilize all those tempting NKVD interrogations that are scattered about in open as well as closed archives.

Roberta T. Manning, Boston College


Serhy Yekelchyk treats the Soviet Union as a multinational empire that promoted elements of national and ethnic identity. Yet unlike similar works, Yekelchyk focuses on two crucial aspects, relations between the two most populous republics of that empire—Russia and Ukraine—and the politics of historical memory. His study, informed by recent approaches to empires and their subjects in postcolonial theory, argues convincingly that Stalin’s “empire of memory” was an imperial discourse that did more than promote Russian hegemony. The Stalinist historical imagination, as it developed in the public sphere on the eve of World War II and up to Stalin’s death, was an imperial discourse that, like other imperial discourses in the modern world, facilitated the development of ethnic and national distinctions. It was the ambiguities of this historical imagination, as well as alternative readings of it by Ukrainians and other non-Russians, which made possible the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Yekelchyk shows that the Stalinist historical imagination both legitimated national patrimony among non-Russians and condemned “bourgeois nationalist” excesses. Amid this ambiguity between “class” and “nation” in the official historical imagination, tacit negotiations over a useable past for Ukrainians took place between local non-Russian intellectuals and their audiences, local bureaucrats, and the Kremlin. During World War II, such negotiations led to the promotion of seventeenth century Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnytsky as a Ukrainian national hero and brief
Concerns over excessive national pride, as well as an awareness of anti-Russian nationalist discourses circulating in Nazi-occupied Ukraine, led to more emphasis on an “unbreakable union” between Ukrainians and Russians throughout their history. For instance, Khmelnytsky’s 1654 agreement with Tsar Alexei, known as the Pereiaslav Treaty, was no longer a “lesser evil” than submission to the Poles or Turks, but the “only right path” for the emergence of a free Ukrainian people. In the immediate postwar years, Ukrainian art, music, films, history, and literature came under assault, particularly during the Zhdanov Era, for “nationalist” deviations.

But local bureaucrats and Ukrainian intellectuals, including those involved in matters of state such as writer Oleksandr Korniichuk, continued to promote such figures as Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, Lesia Ukrainka, the Ukrainian Cossacks (Khmelnytsky above all), and many others, as national heroes who, as junior partners of the “great Russians,” brought about the unification of all ethnic Ukrainian lands into one sovereign socialist state. Furthermore, the Stalinist historical imagination did not succeed in dominating all aspects of the public sphere. Alternative readings of it persisted among the population in Ukraine and came to the surface on the eve of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Yet the Stalinist historical imagination, namely its Ukrainian national heroes and assumptions about the nation’s linear development, left an enduring impact on the public historical imagination of Ukrainians.

Yekelchyk, drawing on a number of archival sources in Kyiv and Moscow, writes clearly and persuasively. Admittedly, two minor errors concerning western Ukraine did occur in the text. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Poland took place in September, not in August, of 1939 (p. 24). As for the unveiling of the Ivan Franko monument in front of the Franko Lviv State University, this occurred in 1964 and not in 1956, as the author suggests on page 125. But in no way should these remarks diminish Yekelchyk’s contribution to our understanding of how empires function and especially how the politics of historical imagination can serve to legitimate and deconstruct the legitimacy of such imperial endeavors.

William Jay Risch, Georgia College and State University


This study joins the handful of important reassessments of the Cold War that the opening of archives in the former Communist countries has made possible. The book is meticulously documented, deliciously detailed, and compellingly written, and it reopens important interpretive questions in light of previously unavailable archival evidence from Moscow and Berlin. Those who know Cold War studies well will find that they have to revise some of their considered opinions, and those who teach the subject will find that this book has just become required reading on their syllabi.

Harrison’s interest is primarily interpretive, but her findings go to the heart of theoretical debates in international relations. She lays bare in astonishing detail the internal politics of the Soviet bloc as seen from the East German perspective, and finds that the “superally” had remarkable influence over, and autonomy from, the superpower. Others have described the diversity in the Soviet bloc, but Harrison brings it into focus and gives us a ringside seat. It is a surprise to discover how critical the Soviet leadership was of Ulbricht’s hardline Stalinist policies, and how close it came to removing him from power before the 1953 uprising in the GDR. Indeed, the Soviet ambassador’s cables to Moscow reveals a clearheaded analysis of the illegitimacy of the Communist regime in the GDR, and the transcripts of meetings between Ulbricht and Khrushchev reveal that the subject of emigration through Berlin was constantly on the table. Ulbricht’s fate hung in the balance in 1956, but he was saved again by fortuitous crises in Hungary and Poland and the first tremors of the Sino-Soviet rift.
Harrison goes on to show that Ulbricht and Khrushchev had divergent preferences that led them to clash over tactics. Ulbricht prioritized controlling the lines of supply across GDR territory and ultimately seizing West Berlin. Khrushchev's concern about Berlin was more instrumental—the drain of skilled labor through Berlin was the GDR's Achilles' heel—and he attached a higher priority to putting diplomatic pressure on the United States than to territorial objectives. It is startling to see how daringly Ulbricht expressed himself, often in a style more appropriate to an equal than to a supplicant. On the key strategic questions such as building the Berlin Wall, however, Khrushchev ordered Ulbricht not to act without permission and set the timetable.

The one place where this remarkable book leaves us wishing for more is the discussion of Soviet policymaking. Harrison provides glimpses into the process, often from copies of documents in the Berlin archives; however, as she acknowledges, her documentary base is more fragmentary on the Soviet side. Unfortunately, access to Russian archives was curtailed after the initial period of openness in the early 1990s, so many of the key documents will probably remain buried for another generation. As a result, though, we are left guessing at the domestic forces that constrained Khrushchev's strategies. Did he have the latitude to replace Ulbricht at key junctures? How much Politburo support did he have for his brinkmanship over Berlin? Most important, what did he really hope to achieve?

Harrison adopts the view of Khrushchev as an erratic and ambivalent leader who took a perverse pleasure in danger, who began conflicts with the United States without having thought through his exit strategies, and whose ultimate goals were constantly in flux. This may indeed be the best interpretation of Khrushchev. On the other hand, he had incentives to assure Ulbricht that he shared his commitment to a Communist West Berlin when he was urging him to be patient; his bluster to Kennedy can be dismissed as cheap talk; and his subsequent commentaries attempted to put his policies in the best possible light. If his objectives and tactics appear to be inconsistent, perhaps this was because he was uncertain how much of his maximum program he could achieve, and he had no audience to which he could safely unveil it.

Randall W. Stone, University of Rochester


“Empire” is ubiquitous in the post-Soviet literature on Russia and the USSR, but is there yet a new imperial history of the former Soviet space? The editors of the journal Ab Imperio, who have put together this valuable collection of essays, wish to define the parameters of such a history. It would, they hope, focus on the method of analyzing the imperial, rather than simply on classifications and definitions of what is imperial. Although they are skeptical of the possibility of a truly universal theory of empire (“‘imperiology’ ... equally applicable to Russia and Great Britain, to ancient Rome and to the Aztecs,” [p. 24]), they suggest an archaeology of knowledge about empire as the most appropriate form for the new imperial history to take. Only such an approach can counter the teleologies of nationalist historiographies by bringing out the complexities of social identities masked by them.

The volume under review hopes to be a survey of the field-in-formation. The editors’ Foucauldian goals are not shared in equal measure by the authors of the nineteen articles that form the core of the book. (The volume also doubles as a Festschrift for Seymour Becker, and there is a tribute to him, as well as bibliographic surveys of “imperial” history of the former Soviet space.) Nevertheless, they all share an interest in exploring contingency, in rethinking categories, and in locating them in the process of historical change. Some of the articles have been published in earlier versions; English-reading scholars will be familiar with the contributions by Mark van Hagen and Ron Suny, but their publication in Russian is to be welcomed. Most of the articles deal
with the tsarist period, with only two (Jeremy Smith on Soviet nationalities policies and Marc Bassin on Eurasianism) centrally concerned with the Soviet period.

The articles in this volume present excellent scholarship, based on intensive use of primary sources, and ask questions that would not have been raised fifteen years ago. Nevertheless, none of them uses a comparative framework of analysis, and there is little evidence of any engagement with the field of postcolonial studies that has aroused considerable enthusiasm among historians of the early Soviet period.

Over the last five years, *Ab Imperio* has established itself as a crucial forum for the study of nations, nationalisms, and empire in the post-Soviet space. In addition to providing a forum for the publication of research on a very important topic, *Ab Imperio* serves yet another extremely critical function. By actively seeking contributors from the former Soviet space as well as beyond, the journal creates the possibility not just of debate across national boundaries and historiographical traditions, but indeed of creating a single research community among scholars in a field that has never seen this before. These differences may never be overcome completely, for scholars are (if nothing else) differently positioned *vis-à-vis* the subject depending on where they live and work, but a start has to be made with bringing the work of scholars from different traditions and trajectories together between the covers of the same volume. In this, the book under review here succeeds quite well. The authors work in the United States, Canada, Britain, Germany, Hungary, Ukraine, Russia, and Japan; fourteen of the nineteen articles were translated into Russian, twelve of them from English. The conversation may not be symmetrical, but it is taking place, and we have ventures such as this volume to thank for it.

Adeeb Khalid, Carleton College


A Peterbourgeoise by birth and upbringing, Elena Hellbirg-Hirn has transplanted herself to Helsinki, where she finds ample traces of Petersburgian influence in architecture and city planning, a rich collection of Russian sources in the library, but an intellectual atmosphere relatively free from Russian cultural mythologies, both those of the intelligentsia and those of the state. The SKS Finnish Literary Society has published her book in a handsome format, with wonderful illustrations, many of them juxtaposing contemporary photographs against a dimmer background of older engravings, often with marvelous ironic effect. She has written the book in English—a witty, erudite, and supple English—which may suggest that she wrote it to counter the big publicity brouhaha surrounding the Jubilee of 2003, but which may be simply an expression of Finnish cosmopolitanism. In any case, publication was late enough for her to include an Epilogue about the Jubilee itself, entitled “Ten Days that Did Not Shake the World.”

The Epilogue serves as well to sum up her complex, brilliantly unfolded major theme: the extraordinary flowering of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Russian culture—its architecture, art, drama, music, and above all, its literature—inextricably intertwined with the oppressive empire that sponsored it and established the institutions that sustained it. The oppositional “intelligentsia” that identified itself with and batten on that culture was similarly a product of the regime it opposed, and in the quasi-Oedipal struggle that took place between 1825 and 1917 came unwittingly to resemble its parent, the autocracy. The sacred robed figure of the holy tsar was replaced at first by Lenin and Stalin, but eventually by the “martyred” Pushkin, who became through two centuries of struggle and upheaval the last figure most Russians could agree on as representing “all” of Russia. St. Petersburg as “Cultural Capital” replaced the old Imperial Capital as the latter in turn had replaced Moscow as “the Third Rome.” While the city was tidied and varnished for the
expected influx of distinguished foreign visitors, its inhabitants were told to go somewhere else or stay indoors, and the basic modern urban problems that the city faced were left unattended.

Early in the book Hellbirg writes, “The full urban history of the city of St. Petersburg and its population has yet to be written; it is the history of the Russian monarchy that is generally equated with the history of the capital. Imperial power discourse provided the image of imperial might.” Her purpose, she explains, is to demonstrate “how the city’s self-perception has been shaped by its imperial image, by its position as a military and bureaucratic capital. And how the notorious Russian Imperial Self has been firmly rooted in the Petersburg experience of domination over various ethnic, confessional and social Others” (p. 50). This is not only a fair statement of her intentions, but serves as well to indicate her acknowledged debt to Edward Said’s *Culture and Imperialism* (1993). Said relates the eloquence and power of much of English literature to its existence under the aegis of the British Empire, of whose qualities it partakes even when it is seemingly anti-Imperial as in Conrad’s *Nostromo* and *Heart of Darkness*. Hellbirg tries to do the same, and in large measure succeeds.

Over the eloquent photograph of a “Deserted House on Pionerskaya Street,” Hellbirg writes: “Now thrice renamed, Petersburg has more than ever before turned into a phantom city, as the gap of estrangement and de-synchronisation grows. Most of its contemporary inhabitants know it as Leningrad, and for some of them at least, its old-new name fits like a disguise for a fancy-dress ball covering the dull, familiar face. Leningrad grins through the hollow Petersburg mask, as previously Petersburg loomed behind the Leningrad façade.” She goes on to remark that the “recent politicisation of collective memory,” in addition to spawning “practical confusion,” had also “created a new symbolic rupture in official representations of the past—perhaps in itself a belated reaction to earlier symbolic ruptures caused by the reckless Sovietisation of Petrograd and Leningrad. Entangled in conflicting symbolic divisions, the resulting identity cannot but be ambiguous and unsettled” (pp. 132-133).

Beyond the spruced up and varnished Petersburg of the Jubilee, Hellbirg calls our attention to the contrast between the scrupulously neat and cared for condition of the private apartments and the squalor of the stairways, the strewn garbage of the courtyards, and the criminality of the back-streets which she sees as a kind of secret and perhaps even unconscious revenge the inhabitants take on the pretensions of the oppressive autocratic empire.

*Sidney Monas, University of Texas at Austin*


The central idea of Charles King’s splendid book is that oceans, rivers, and seas have a history of their own. They are not merely highways or boundaries but also central players in distinct stories of human interaction and exchange. The familiar categories through which we form our perceptions—region, nation, people, and civilization—are modern, confining, and capricious (p. 3). King’s Black Sea, like Braudel’s Mediterranean, is not a divider but a binder of peoples, civilizations, and influences. The commonalities lately have been lost behind an edifice of competing empires sparring for control. King’s book is an interesting and highly innovative project to remind us of those commonalities, the “older intellectual map of Europe’s southeastern frontier” (p. 5).

The book covers the 2700 years between the entry of the Greeks into the Black Sea and the activities of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization in the late twentieth century. The earliest and arguably deepest influences on the peoples inhabiting the Black Sea littoral to King are the binding influences. The classical Greeks associated the Black Sea with the place where civilization meets barbarism. The real significance of the encounter, however, lies in the blurred lines of identity it created; entrepreneurship, trade, and migration slowly exerted their influence, leading to a “community of race” (p. 33). The mental division between civilization and barbarism
continued under the Romans, but the division was much narrower when Byzantium became the imperial capital. The Byzantine and Ottoman phases of the history of the Black Sea, to King, represent the epitome of mixing and interdependence, a time of the cohabitation of religions, the mingling of peoples, and the merger of steppe and sea commerce. The Black Sea became the eastern edge of a safe commercial network stretching to China, although by the seventeenth century it was more a burden to the Ottomans than an asset. The Black Sea slid sideways (p. 141) into Europe as European imperial ambitions met on its shores. The Peace of Paris thwarted Russian imperial intentions but also guaranteed uninhibited foreign commercial passage in the Black Sea. This, besides opening the door to tourists and seekers of the exotic, transformed the Black Sea from an Asian to a European body of water (p. 189), and a dark period for an appreciation of interdependence set in. The concepts of homogeneous nations and hegemonic states entered the Black Sea littoral; now, people know who they are, or at least they think they know who they are. All this was enhanced by the twentieth-century ideology of development. Still, the underlying unifying influences did not disappear entirely: massive population transfers starting in the mid-nineteenth century challenged the notion of the homogeneous nation; the Promethean Project, a regional attempt to build a common anti-Communist alliance in the 1920s and 1930s, was made; and a common revolutionary impulse can be found (ironically) in both NATO’s Turkey and in the socialist people’s republics after 1945. The book ends with King’s hope that, in spite of powerful opposing impulses, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization, which formed to collaborate in saving the damaged ecology of the Black Sea, may be able to revive an appreciation of the history and culture which the peoples of the littoral share.

This is a book of enormous scope that excels in innovation and fresh insight. King pays court to no orthodoxies. There is no talk here, for example, of a European postcolonial bifurcated worldview marginalizing the peoples of the Black Sea littoral. The author uses conventional published documents, including travelers’ and observers’ accounts, which he sees as sources of useful empirical information rather than expressions of an Orientalist discourse. King’s use of small stories to verify the larger stories is magisterial (the pieces on Flavius Arrianus, the Comneni emperors, slavery in Ottoman lands, and the lazaretto of Marseilles come immediately to mind). A book covering 2700 years in 276 pages would appear to face formidable obstacles. Charles King, however, puts all doubts to rest. His argument does not waver and his strokes of insight surprise us on every page. This one we all ought to read.

Peter Weisensel, Macalester College

SOCIAL SCIENCE, CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA, AND OTHER


Robert English’s path-breaking work—about the influence of ideas on Soviet behavior during the Cold War’s finalé—ranks among the classics in both International Relations and Russian area studies. It has been widely acclaimed, even by those who incline in different intellectual directions, and remains a touchstone for the ongoing debate about the causes of the Cold War’s peaceful and sudden end. (See, for example, the Spring 2005 issue of *Journal of Cold War Studies*, dedicated entirely to ideas in international relations in the late 1980s.) But if we already know the positive verdict on this book, what is the point, one may ask, of reviewing it again here? Precisely because it is a classic, it remains relevant for students of both Russian politics and international relations. Precisely because the causes of the Cold War’s end remain a source of debate, we need to continue trying to understand them now. And precisely because the way policymakers settle this debate, and the lessons they extract from it, condition the foreign policies they choose, this debate continues
to be of utmost importance today. It thus behooves students of contemporary international relations to read or reread English’s book, given its insightful exploration of the causes of the Cold War’s burial—not to mention its important implications for the Post-post-Cold War era upon us now.

In enjoyable prose, English tells a fascinating story of long-term intellectual change in the USSR that ultimately transformed the Soviet Union itself. That story unfolds thus: the post-Stalin thaw triggered a thirty-year revision of Soviet beliefs, values, and identity toward more European, or Western, thinking. This three-decade revision encompassed a broad swathe of Soviet intellectuals, who in general sought democratic guarantees against totalitarianism and were exposed to Western ideas, prosperity, and political structures. By the early 1980s, this intelligentsia had generated a treasure trove of unorthodox ideas—ideas that implicitly challenged Soviet ideology and its political foundations. But those ideas, called “new thinking,” remained dormant or politically irrelevant until two contingent factors converged. First, deteriorating economic conditions in the country triggered the drive for some kind of change. Second, the general secretariatship, by far the most important political institution in the USSR, became occupied by a leader who was sympathetic to the intelligentsia’s unorthodox, Westernizing ideas. The combination of these two elements explains the radical changes of the Gorbachev era: first, material incentives triggered the need for change; second, a sweeping mass of reformist ideas indicated the direction for change; and third, a reform-minded leadership launched, drove, and institutionalized that change. In this complex context, English shows how “new thinking” played an independent, primary role in leading the Cold War to an unexpected, peaceful end. Had “new thinking” not existed, English demonstrates, more hard-lined policy paths would probably have prevailed.

But not all critics are satisfied with this conclusion. While they admit that “new thinking” was important, they disagree over how much. For them, material incentives trumped new ideas in driving Soviet retrenchment and reform. Nevertheless, these critics concede that English comes closest to offering substantial evidence, suggesting the independent, causal role of ideas in ending the Cold War. And most everyone agrees to the book’s importance. How might this book help us make sense of the post-Soviet era?

Three points stand out. First, English’s story about “new thinking” alerts us to the risks of ignoring the potential political power of ideas in international change. Those Western elites in the early 1980s, dismissing any possibility for voluntary, radical Soviet reform, did so because they ignored or denied the potential power of ideas in combination with leadership.

Second, as English explains, the Gorbachev era was ultimately about the wholesale transformation of Soviet identity from an anti-Western Other to a Western-embracing Self, with radical implications for Soviet behavior. This transformation focuses our attention on the importance of national identity and its effects on Russian international behavior today.

Finally, English implicitly challenges the current academic predilection for rigorous, theoretical methodologies. As one of the most satisfactory works on the Cold War’s finalé, English’s book does not rely on theoretical austerity, but on abundant empirical evidence, emphasis on context, and area expertise. To paraphrase Richard Herrmann, rigorous logic should never replace rich area studies.

Julie Newton, The American University of Paris, and St. Antony’s College


Iulia Shevchenko, of the European University of St. Petersburg, has performed a tremendous service to scholarship in compiling essential factual information about the composition and structure of the Russian government over a period of extremely rapid change. She traces the evolution of the central government from the late Gorbachev period through 2004, and argues that in periods when
the government is given little autonomy to develop policy, it tends to retain or recreate “Soviet-style” organizational structures and practices, including competing “internal” decision-making bodies, and characterized by the proliferation of interdepartmental commissions and councils. In periods when it is assigned greater responsibility for policy development, it adapts its structure and procedures in such a way as to enable it to perform more efficiently. Such delegation is more likely to take place, she shows, when there is competition over the direction of state policy, or when there is high uncertainty over how to accomplish policy goals, when principals are eager to shift the blame for unpopular policies to the government.

Shevchenko uses several criteria to assess the degree to which the government is able to exercise a significant role in making policy. These include the stature of the head of government, the degree to which the government is organized along branches as opposed to functional lines, the dispersion or concentration of decision-making authority, the level of control by the government over its own staff apparatus, and the formalization of procedures for decision-making. She reviews each phase of the government’s development according to these criteria. She finds that the periods when the government showed signs of vigor, independence, and efficiency included the Pavlov government in 1991, when the government resisted Gorbachev; Gaidar’s government in 1992, when neither the president nor parliament was especially keen to assume responsibility for the details of economic policy; and the Primakov government in late 1998–early 1999, when the cabinet gained authority for a brief time at the expense of the presidential administration.

The author draws on press accounts, interviews, and official records to analyze both actual political relations within the government, such as the factional or political leanings of particular figures, and the government’s relationship to the parliament and president. A recurrent pattern in her account is the effort by internal units of the government, particularly its Presidium (a strikingly resilient body) and its “Commission on Urgent Issues,” to usurp the power formally attached to the entire government. Much in the way that the Presidium or Politburo of the Communist party usurped the authority officially vested in the Central Committee to decide policy, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet usurped the power formally belonging to the Supreme Soviet, so too the Presidium of the government has chronically usurped the power nominally possessed by the government as a whole. Likewise, the Commission on Urgent Issues claimed the right to decide matters that could not be postponed for a full cabinet meeting, until it was finally killed off, perhaps for good, after Putin took office.

Shchchenko’s book reinforces a point that applies to many states. In the absence of mechanisms to hold a government politically accountable for its performance based on defined policy commitments in a system of open party competition, the government becomes the arena for factional struggles among organized interests operating through particular government structures. This tendency disperses responsibility for performance and undermines efficiency. These characteristics of the Russian government will be sadly familiar to students of bureaucratic politics in the old Soviet regime.

Thomas F. Remington, Emory University


This excellent volume brings together ten updated essays published by Andrei Shleifer and his collaborators over the 1990s through 2005. In the latest essay Shleifer argues that by the year 2000 Russia had been transformed into a “normal,” middle-income country with a “highly imperfect” democracy and market economy. Private consumption “probably” regained its 1990 level by 2003.
This material progress Shleifer credits to actions during the early Yeltsin period which reduced the powers of Communist bureaucrats over the economy—the chief accomplishment of that era.

Just who was responsible for this supposedly irreversible transformation? Mikhail Gorbachev was merely an enlightened Communist whose partial reforms led only to a collapse of output in 1989–91. Boris Yeltsin himself showed “considerable volatility in his beliefs” (p. 90), while Yegor Gaidar and his colleagues were incapable of completing a liberal reform. Privatization was carried through by 1994 in ways to appease managers, workers, and local officials, but many of these hasty actions were “badly done” (p. 54). The best Russian politicians (Grigori Yavlinsky, for example) are still “confused” about the optimal role for the state in transition economies. As for the other outsiders, despite conspiracies charged by anthropologist Janine Wedel, they had little influence on the mismanagement and illicit private enrichment which has characterized post-Communist Russia. Shleifer himself had a hand in advising the Russian government, but his fraudulent self-dealing in state securities has destroyed any reputation for prudent judgment.

Despite his legal difficulties, Shleifer is undeniably a brilliant and strong-minded liberal. Most of these essays instantiate his case that in countries like Russia, with its weak traditions of democracy, politicians cannot be trusted to run the economy. New managers are needed, not just privatization, to resist the bureaucrats’ blandishments. While some economic regulation had been established by the Yelstin government, it easily became a pretext for bribes. For example, the antimonopoly commission, established in 1991, prompted managers to pay bribes to get off the list of monopolies. Even now government inhibits normal competition and limits bankruptcy of failed enterprises. Other reforms provide new opportunities to demand bribes: to register land, to obtain permits to export oil, or to pass safety and other inspections. Shleifer is relatively pessimistic about the prospects of limiting corruption without stronger democracy in Russia, yet he admits that under Putin democracy has “deteriorated considerably” (p. 170).

In their important title essay, Shleifer and Daniel Treisman point out that flawed elections, press controls, pervasive inequality, oligarchic control of banks and large industrial combines, and corruption are characteristic of other middle-income countries such as Mexico, Argentina, South Korea, and Brazil—not to mention Russia’s neighbors to the south. True, only Russia has nuclear weapons and big-power status, but no matter, it no longer threatens “its own people and the rest of the world” (p. 182)!

Whatever the putative effects of its middling development, Russia also remains a transition economy with some of the negative traits of a “petrol state.” Most Russian enterprises are now the property of former managers and workers, though their share values are comparatively low, owing to wholesale abuse of shareholders’ rights. As for taxes, rates have been cut, but administration is still arbitrary and discriminatory, as the Khodorkovsky affair has shown. Small and medium-size businesses remain underdeveloped, while the state bureaucracy has grown one-quarter since 1994. Besides salaries, the government is using some of its oil windfall to improve health and education, but cannot contain widening chaos in the North Caucasus. Foreign direct investment is up, but so is capital flight. So even with the “grabbing hand” of bureaucrats and mafia, there is mixed evidence of some transformation.

Shleifer’s overconfidence in his own judgments leads to some of the flaws of these essays. He ignores or dismisses the work of other qualified observers and offers weakly supported judgments about China, Central Asia, and many of the countries of Eastern Europe. Worst of all, aside from two sample surveys of Russian shops, he provides little or no documentation to back up his account of the Russian transition. Perhaps when his legal problems are finally resolved, he will give us an insider account of what he really saw and did.

Martin C. Spechler, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
Hillary Appel’s (Claremont McKenna College) book seeks to explain the impact of ideology and ideological change in the emergence of capitalism in Russia and Eastern Europe (although the main focus is on Russia and the Czech Republic). It only partly succeeds in this project.

The book is divided into three sections: Part I, “Bringing Ideology Back In” (two chapters), Part II, “Probing the Czech and Russian Cases” (two chapters), and Part III, “Elaborating the Theoretical Framework” (four chapters). Part I is perhaps the weakest section of the book, and these weaknesses to a certain extent reappear in Part III. Appel borrows her definition of ideology from Malcolm Hamilton: “A system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct which its proponents seek to promote, realize, pursue, or maintain” (p. 8). The difficulty here is that basically any statement, idea, or notion about Russia or Eastern Europe will purportedly be ideological; this leads Appel to downplay—in my view—the objective (she calls them “material”) forces driving liberalization and privatization, and further leads to a failure to clearly distinguish nationalist, religious, cultural, and other influences from ideological ones. Contrast this with Maurice Dobb’s definition of ideology as “a whole system of thought or coordinated set of beliefs and ideas, which forms a framework, or higher level group of related concepts, for more specific and particular notions, analyses, applications, and conclusions” (Theories of Value and Distribution Since Adam Smith, 1973, [p. 1]). Also puzzling is Appel’s contention that Marxists conceptualize ideology as “false consciousness” (p. 8). Dobb is certainly one of the preeminent Marxist thinkers of the twentieth century, and nothing in his definition suggests Appel’s interpretation.

Part II of the book provides case studies of privatization in the Czech Republic and Russia, respectively. This is where the author is at her best. The chapter on Russia, in particular, is an excellent summary and dateline of the events and legislation surrounding privatization (and liberalization). Here too, however, Appel’s particular definition of ideology leads her to somewhat downplay the realization by the most senior party and government leadership that they had a strong material interest in abandoning the Soviet model and embracing privatization. Not only would their prospects of accumulating wealth increase sharply, but their likelihood of retaining or even increasing their political power would be enhanced.

Turning to Part III, Appel’s tenuous treatment of ideology weakens the analysis. For example, in a brief discussion of Slovakia, she essentially couches her discussion of Slovakia’s trajectory (as compared to the Czech Republic’s) in terms of Slovak nationalism (p. 148), but then redefines nationalism as “ideological context” (p.149). Such a reduction of every developmental influence to ideology does not seem helpful.

Finally, the book relies heavily on secondary sources. Moreover, when the author suggests a near unanimity among Western economists on the desirability of rapid liberalization and privatization in the early years of the reform, she never mentions Michael Ellman, surely the dean of Western Sovietology and one who was skeptical of Soviet reform strategies. Ronald McKinnon of Stanford is another economist who expressed doubts in the 1980s. Others could be cited in this vein as well.

Nicholas N. Kozlov, Hofstra University


When Kyrgyzstani president Askar Akayev was ousted in March 2005—in an episode that was part popular revolution and part regime collapse—the regime, the opposition, and outside observers
were all caught by surprise. Central Asia had enjoyed few of the “preconditions” for democracy; what occurred confounded the prevailing pessimism about the region’s democratic prospects. Had any of these actors read Yaacov Ro’i’s historically grounded and timely volume, they might have gained reason for limited optimism. The book’s unifying theme is that Muslim Eurasia must not be understood as doomed to authoritarianism and inequality. The book’s nineteen substantive chapters—by some of the best Israeli, European, and post-Soviet scholars of Eurasia—keep a window open to a variety of possible futures.

The volume is divided into four major sections. The first examines historical cases in which proto-democratic institutions preceded Soviet rule, exploding the myth that Muslim Eurasia is inherently predisposed against democracy. Thus, Dov Yaroshevski (chap. 4) and Azade-Ayse Rorlich (chap. 3) separately and effectively trace prodemocracy movements in the late imperial period.

The second section asks a two-tiered question: Can Islam be reconciled with democracy, and what, if anything, can outside actors do to facilitate such a reconciliation? Ro’i (chap. 6) argues that Islam is not an inevitable impediment to democracy, but Richard Pomfret (chap. 5) shows that Western economic aid has been too limited to have an impact on political reform in the region.

The third section (at eight chapters by far the longest) consists of case studies of Muslim successor states (Turkmenistan is excluded, presumably because of its neo-Stalinist system. This is a shame, since prodemocracy Turkmen exiles work actively from Moscow and northern Europe for political reform in Ashghabad). Contributions range from Neil Mevin’s comparative exercise—a fascinating attempt to explain variation among Central Asia’s authoritarians—to Pål Kolstø and Saodat Oimova’s detailed description of political dynamics in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, respectively. All chapters add empirical complexity that makes it impossible to argue that any Muslim state of Eurasia is inherently antidemocratic.

The final section comprises case studies of nominally Muslim regions of the Russian Federation. Given the striking degree of de facto autonomy achieved in many (though not all) of these regions, such an approach (that is, considering them as separate “cases”) is one of the strengths of the book. Nonetheless, by including them the editor introduces a variety of factors to which the volume cannot do justice. For example, the degree of democracy and pluralism in each region depends largely on relations with Moscow, but Moscow’s own changing experience with democracy easily warrants a separate volume of its own.

A book of this historical and geographic scope and conceptual ambition is bound to have shortcomings. First, it would have benefited from a map, to make it more accessible to the nonspecialist. Moreover, the book lacks grounding in democratic theory. While this is not a work of political philosophy, a basic discussion would prevent conceptual stretching, such as the use of “democratization” to describe developments in Uzbekistan in the 1990s. Likewise, the term “pluralism” requires grounding, since it can refer either to a multitude of political ideas or to a multitude of cultural groups. Also, many chapters would benefit from stronger contextualization. When Dzhunusova (chap. 1) focuses on the “democratic tradition” of pre-Soviet Kazakhstan while giving limited attention to nondemocratic traditions, for example, we are left wondering about the relative proportions of each. Likewise, when Khanin (chap. 11) offers a detailed discussion of “clans” in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, we are left asking about their significance compared to other factors in political life.

Ro’i’s volume is ultimately a success, in part because it asks fascinating questions about crucial, if understudied, parts of Eurasia. (Indeed, Ro’i was perhaps prescient; many people initially questioned the worth of asking about democracy and pluralism in the region [p. 375].) How, if at all, does ethnic pluralism affect the prospects for democratization? What roles, if any, do Islamic actors play in the democratization process? Do region-based or clan-based social structures present an impediment to democracy? What role exists for outsiders who advocate political change in the region? The answers remain elusive, but ongoing changes in Muslim Eurasia ensure that the questions are worth asking.

Edward Schatz, University of Toronto

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian government initially pursued a policy of cooperation and integration with the West. However, stung by Washington’s insensitivity to Russian national interests and their near exclusion on important policy issues, foreign policy elites redirected the country along a more independent course of action by 1993. The change of course was most evident in Russian-U.S. differences over Serbia. Vladimir Putin’s ascension to the presidency brought with it a greater assertiveness in pursuit of Russian national interests and increasing confrontation with the United States on a number of issues, among them NATO expansion and the U.S. decision to renege on its commitment to the ABM treaty. However, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, U.S.-Russian relations were perceived by many as having turned around. The apparent change in Russian foreign policy has prompted many foreign policy observers to conclude that Russia has since become a reliable U.S. strategic partner.

Janusz Bugajski contends otherwise. Arguing for essential continuity in Russian foreign policy since 1993, he contends that post-Communist Russia has remained focused on the primary goal of regaining a position as a major power in the international system. A crucial element in the strategy is establishing Russian dominance in post-Communist Europe. Russian hegemony in the region would assure Moscow a sphere of influence and base of support for its global pretensions. It would also provide greater access to Western Europe, whose energy dependence can be manipulated to encourage closer Russian-EU cooperation and undermine the U.S. role on the continent. This in turn would facilitate the emergence of both Russia and the EU as counter-poles to the United States, whose global hegemony blocks Russia’s path to restoring a claim to shaping the international system.

While Bugajski presents this as the dominant view of Russian foreign policy in the capitals of post-Communist Europe, it is clear that it is a view he holds as well. Indeed, the purpose of the book is rather straightforward: to warn U.S. policymakers of the true intentions of the Russian state. In that sense, his thesis is less one of continuity in Russian foreign policy since 1993 than one of continuity with the Soviet past. Many readers will remember debates during the Soviet era concerning the key levers of Soviet control over the countries of the Warsaw Pact. While some asserted that control of national militaries assured that these countries could not challenge Soviet hegemony, a more nuanced argument was that their economies were tied into that of the Soviet Union through a dense web of formal and informal arrangements. Central to these arrangements was the energy dependence of the client states. Bugajski identifies many of these same patterns in post-Soviet Russia’s foreign policy in the region. He argues that Moscow seeks to create or maintain the energy dependence of the region on cheap Russian oil and gas, to integrate the region into a single energy grid, and to gain controlling shares in or otherwise invest in economically strategic industries. Toward these ends, the Russian state orchestrates the efforts of business, intelligence services (engaging in subversion and disinformation), and criminal structures.

Russia has thus far managed to establish a substantial degree of influence in the post-Communist space despite its apparent political, economic, and military weakness. Not surprisingly, it has not met with the same degree of success in every instance. Bugajski carefully catalogs the degree to which it has succeeded in each country in the region. While he makes a compelling case, we are not told why Russia holds such ambitious pretensions in international affairs. Is this a legacy of the Soviet past, or is it rooted in Russian history? Answers to these questions might be helpful to U.S. policymakers seeking to deal with Russian designs in post-Communist Europe.

Terry D. Clark, Creighton University
When Mikhail Gorbachev put an end to the Cold War, reactions in the West were pure elation. The end of history had arrived and it was time to cash in on the peace dividend. When Boris Yeltsin proceeded to catapult the Russian Federation into political chaos and a hyperdepression that ended in financial collapse, elation gave way to shock and dismay. When Vladimir Putin in turn set out to recreate a strong state, he at first was praised for political stability and economic growth, but then began to attract flak for “democratic backsliding” and for the messy onslaught against Yukos.

What is most remarkable about these swings in Western moods and imagery about Russia is that worry always tends to focus on potential consequences of Russian weakness—ranging from overpowering corruption to rampant crime, epidemic disease, the spread of loose nukes, and perhaps even civil war in a nuclear superpower. Throughout, however, there is a striking lack of worry about potentially negative consequences of Russian strength.

It seems as though ever since the collapse of the USSR, and the subsequent devastation of the Soviet military-industrial complex (VPK), there has been a tacit consensus among Western Russia-watchers that Russia will never again be returned to superpower status and may thus be safely discounted as a future security threat.

To most, the very thought of suggesting that such a possibility exists would likely appear so poorly grounded in reality, indeed be so politically incorrect, that it would be a real conversation stopper. But what if? What if that were to be precisely what is going on, right under our very noses? What if the ambitions of the Kremlin and the Genshtab really are to return Russia to superpower status, with a military might that is on par with that of the United States?

Precisely the latter is what Steven Rosefielde suggests in his book about Russia in the twenty-first century. He grabs the bull squarely by the horns by stating that while a liberal and democratic outcome remains possible, it is “more likely that Russia will re-emerge as a ‘prodigal superpower’ with a colossal military burden” (p. 3). Although this is more of a warning than a prediction, the ensuing argument is disturbingly sound and logical. It rests on three main propositions.

The first holds that Western Sovietology got the USSR wrong, in two separate ways. One concerns the number-crunchers, and alleges that methodological shortcomings caused a serious underestimation of the Soviet defense burden, to the point where agencies like the CIA failed to see that Soviet arms expenditure may actually have outpaced that of the United States. For amateurs and aficionados alike, this account harbors much food for thought. The other failure was more conceptual and goes to the heart of what the book is all about. Being used to thinking in terms of trade-offs between guns and butter, Western observers were blinded to the reality of Soviet “structural militarization.” By deliberately trading down the quality of civilian provision, the system could allow the military to engage in preparing defenses for even the most unthinkable of scenarios. This was the “prodigal” superpower.

The second part of the argument holds that Russia has still not succeeded in Westernizing, but remains instead mired in a distant Muscovite past. The main point here is that the continued absence of accountable government and enforceable property rights places the Kremlin in a position where the traditional reliance on forced resource mobilization from above remains within reach.

The third part really is a corollary to the second, arguing that with the old VPK, now the OPK, being largely intact, and with massive income from raw materials exports, the Kremlin not only has the model but also the resources necessary to embark on sweeping remilitarization. If the Genshtab were to get all that is on its current wish list, the process may end in “full spectrum, fifth generation armed forces significantly larger than America’s in almost every category, including national missile defense,” (p. 89) and it could do so already by 2010.
The grand conclusion of the book is that Western policy must take this into account, and try hard to dissuade Putin from going down a road that “threatens to destabilize world security and is certain to blight the lives of most Russians” (p. 10). While many readers will surely be prone to raise objections, technical and otherwise, on one or perhaps all of the above counts, what will have to remain is the disturbing possibility that if the analysis is both correct and ignored—then what?

Stefan Hedlund, Uppsala University


Matthew Crosston’s book, *Separatism: Implications for Democratic Consolidation*, is one of the more important and thoughtful recent studies of Russian center-periphery relations. Backed by solid empirical research, it fundamentally challenges much of the prevailing thinking on the bilateral treaties the Russian government signed with forty-six of its eighty-nine component or subject (sub’ekt) governments between 1994 and 1998. Crosston’s main thesis is that “the use of bilateral autonomy treaties, though meant to alleviate regional concern and push the state down an irretrievably federal democratic path, instead created a hyperperipheralized federation that undermined Russia’s chances for long term democratic stability” (p. 1). His second thesis is that the evolution of Russian center-periphery conflict cannot be fully explained by ethnic and economic factors, as is frequently done. Instead, it can be better understood by a focus on institutional developments, such as the bilateral treaties.

To examine his theses, in chapter 2 Crosston reviews the institutional evolution of Russian federalism in three stages: the Federation Treaty, the 1993 Constitution, and the bilateral treaties. He argues that each of these contained significant, in his view near fatal, flaws. Each was ambiguous as to the individual powers of each level of government; each was contradictory internally and with the others; each allowed the component governments to seize almost unlimited power; and each created asymmetry among the sub’ekt governments. According to Crosston, the result was a federation, or maybe a confederation, that was neither stable, nor democratic.

While chapter 2 includes a cursory overview of ten bilateral treaties, the next three chapters provide in-depth analyses of those with Tatarstan, Sverdlovsk Oblast, and Lipetsk Oblast. While the author has carefully selected an ethnic republic with a treaty, a Russian-majority oblast with a treaty, and a Russian-majority oblast without a treaty, these are not necessarily representative. It is thus somewhat troubling that the author draws such definitive conclusions from these cases. Also, the author seems overly laudatory of the decisions made by Lipetsk Oblast, and to hold it up as a model. There is much to be admired in Lipetsk’s handling of center-periphery relations, yet Lipetsk’s charter (ustav) had twenty articles that conflicted with the federal Constitution or legislation, and attempts to remedy these, while ultimately successful, were conflict-laden. The author’s extensive field research in and interviewing in Lipetsk may have given him a natural sympathy, while his harsher assessments of the other sub’ekt governments appear to be based relatively more on secondary sources.

Another minor criticism is that the author tends to downplay or ignore the benefits of a looser federalism, particularly for ethnic, religious, or cultural minorities. While an ethnically Russian oblast like Lipetsk may be quite comfortable with allowing the national government predominance over linguistic or educational policy, this involves far more risk for Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, or even Sakha.

These quibbles aside, Crosston’s study offers a weighty challenge to the literature. Whether or not one supports Putin’s federal reforms, Crosston’s study should help persuade even Putin’s
harshest critics that the federal system he inherited from Yeltsin was dangerously flawed. As Crosston argues, the treaties “neither constrained politically deviant behavior nor encouraged greater center-periphery cooperation” (p. 121). Instead, their effect was to accelerate the regional grabs for power. They also decreased democracy by concentrating undue power in the hands of the sub’ekt executives and by diminishing national oversight. Only after comprehending the inherently flawed nature of Russian federalism under Yeltsin can we proceed to a fair assessment of Putin’s reforms. In this endeavor Crosston’s book is vital step which should be required reading for analysts of contemporary Russian politics.

Daniel R. Kempton, Northern Illinois University


This book is the first attempt at a comprehensive snapshot of Slavic Collections in North America in almost thirty years, and Allan Urbanic (University of California-Berkeley) and Beth Feinberg (University of California-Los Angeles) provide a great service in collecting and publishing the data within it. They had the daunting task of contacting Slavic librarians throughout North America, sending out their surveys in the first place, insuring that they received the maximum possible response, and finally taking the responses and putting them into a consistent and helpful form.

The last comprehensive guide in the United States was published nearly thirty years ago, Paul L. Horecky’s East Central and Southeast Europe. A Handbook of Library and Archival Resources in North America (1976). Although there have been other more specialized surveys over the years, Horecky’s work has stood alone until Urban’s and Feinberg’s effort to produce a new, updated, and thorough volume.

Looking abroad for such guides, there is also Library Resources in Britain for the Study of Eastern Europe and the Former U.S.S.R., compiled by Gregory Walker and Jackie Johnson (1992). This provides similar survey information for the United Kingdom, and is a revision of an earlier effort in 1981, which succeeded the original 1971 publication. However, so far there is no early twenty-first century update.

It may be asked why this work is important. Library collections are still the backbone of the work of many scholars. The benefit of having a library that provides easy access to the material needed to do research, both secondary and primary, is invaluable to most scholars. Thus, knowing where your resources are located is vital information. While it is perhaps easy to make generalizations about which are the major collections, the reality is usually more complex. Everyone knows about Harvard, Columbia, Illinois, Hoover, and so on. But does everyone know the highlights of these institutions’ current collecting policies and the lacunae that may have developed within these collections? Are they aware of the other large, important collections around the continent? As important, are they aware of the many smaller, more concentrated collections not widely known?

Urbanic and Feinberg have collected this information and provided a framework that eases use. The different librarians submitted their own information, but the editors insured that this information is laid out in an easily readable format. This current snapshot is very different in form than the Horecky volume. Horecky published detailed descriptions of the various collections. Now such descriptions are usually more accurately provided by the different subject librarians and are displayed through their various library web sites and within online catalogues. These web descriptions can be and are often changed as needed, where the printed book cannot. The survey provides links to the specific pages where this information is held. Additionally they also provide useful suggestions on finding this information again after the address inevitably has been changed.
This, then, is a compact, useful guide to Slavic Collections in North America. It does not take up much space on a bookshelf, not does it cost much money. That should make it convenient to professors and their students, guiding them to the library resources most suited for their needs.

Sandra Levy, University of Chicago